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I. INTRODUCTION
The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act ("SHVIA")' changed
the face of the market for television video services by authorizing direct
broadcast satellite ("DBS") carriers to carry local television stations within
their own local markets. Prior to the passage of this law, households could
subscribe to satellite-delivered network programming only if they could
demonstrate that they could not receive good over-the-air signals from their
local network affiliates. Since the passage of SHVIA on November 29,
1999, DBS carriers have become powerful players in the marketplace for
video distribution-a market currently dominated by rapidly consolidating
cable companies. To encourage this new competitor with cable, SHVIA
granted DBS carriers a royalty-free statutory copyright license to carry
2local broadcast stations in their own markets. In exchange, to ensure the
availability of all local channels over satellite, the local carriage provisions
of SHVIA (codified at section 338 of the Communications Act) establish
that, by 2002, if a DBS system carries a local broadcast station pursuant to
this statutory copyright license, the satellite carrier must carry all of the
local broadcast stations in that market.3 On September 20, 2000, this carry-
one/carry-all provision was challenged in federal court on the grounds that
it violated the First Amendment rights of satellite carriers.4
In Part II, this Article examines how the "local-into-local" portion of
SHVIA works to equalize the treatment of DBS and cable in the market for
the distribution of video services. Part III discusses the constitutional
challenge to the law and examines the constitutional geography of SHVIA
within the context of current broadcast jurisprudence. Part IV then applies
these principles, arguing: (a) DBS has been, and should be, considered a
broadcast technology for constitutional purposes; (b) § 338 imposes
content-neutral restrictions on speech; (c) § 338 therefore survives under
rational basis scrutiny; and (d) alternatively, § 338 survives under
intermediate scrutiny as well.
1. SHVIA was passed as part of the Intellectual Property and Communications
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-521, Title I.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 122 (Supp. V 1999).
3. 47 U.S.C.A. § 338 (West Supp. 2000).
4. Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Satellite Broad. and Comms. Ass'n
of Am. v. FCC (E.D. Va. Sept. 20,2000) (No. 00-1571-A).
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II. THE SATELLITE HOME VIEWER IMPROVEMENT ACT OF
1999: LOCAL CARRIAGE PROVISIONS
DBS services (alternatively known as "Direct-to-Home" or "DTH"
services) provide video programming directly to a consumer's home via
satellite transmission to a small receiving dish at the home. The two largest
DBS service providers are DirecTV6 and EchoStar's Dish Network.7 DBS
had its origins in the large direct-to-home satellite dishes introduced in the
1970s for the reception of video programming transmitted via satellite over
the low-power C-band frequencies. Although the C band is still used in
some circumstances, DBS service providers currently operate mostly in the
Ku band' and plan to operate in portions of the Ka band'° in the near
future." Since 1982, DBS service has been governed on an "interim" basis
by Part 100 of the rules of the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission"),'2 and until 1999, consisted mostly of the
delivery of national network feeds, nonlocal network stations, and
nonbroadcast proprietary programming.
In 1988, the Satellite Home Viewer Act ("SHVA") became law and
5. The FCC's regulations define a "direct broadcast satellite service" as a
"radiocommunication service in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations
are intended for direct reception by the general public." The regulations further state: "In the
Direct Broadcast Satellite Service the term direct reception shall encompass both individual
reception and community reception." FCC Safety and Special Radio Servs., 47 C.F.R. §
100.3 (2000).
6. See DirecTV, About DirecTV, at http://www.directv.comifaboutaboutpages/
0,1119,137,00.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2001).
7. See Dish Network, About Dish Network, at http://www.dishnetwork.conlcontentl
aboutus/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
8. "C band" refers to frequencies between 3 GHz and 6 GHz. MARK E. LONG, THE
DIGITAL SATELLITE TV HANDBOOK 7 (1999).
9. "Ku band" refers to frequencies between 10 GHz and 17 GHz. Id. at 7. For purposes
of DBS in the United States, "Ku band" refers to the uplink frequencies at 14.0-14.5 GHz
and the corresponding downlink frequencies at 11.7-12.7 GHz. Establishment of Policies
and Serv. Rules for the Mobile Satellite Serv. in the 2 GHz Band, Report and Order, 15
F.C.C.R. 16,127, para. 78 (2000) [hereinafter Mobile Satellite Service, Report and Order].
10. "Ka band" refers to frequencies between 18 GHz and 22 GHz. LONG, supra note 8,
at 7. For purposes of DBS in the United States, "Ka band" refers to the uplink frequencies at
27.5-30.0 GHz and the corresponding downlink frequencies at 17.7-20.2 GHz. Mobile
Satellite Service, Report and Order, supra note 9, para. 81.
11. For instance, Local TV on Satellite plans on launching two Ka-band satellites for
the provision of service to local markets on a wholesale basis. See Local TV on Satellite,
System Design, at http://www.localtv-satellite.comlindexl.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2001).
Also, EchoStar plans on launching EchoStar IX which will operate as a hybrid Ku-band and
Ka-band satellite. See Loral, Space Station/Lorel to Build Two More EchoStar Direct
Broadcast Satellites, at http://www.loral.com/inthenews/000310.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2001).
12. See 47 C.F.R. § 100.1 et seq. (2000).
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restricted the reception of satellite-delivered television signals to those
"unserved households" that could not receive acceptable over-the-air
signals from their local network affiliates with stationary roof-top
antennae. 3 SHVA did this through the mechanism of a statutory copyright
license. Ordinarily, broadcast television stations possess the exclusive right
to create copies of their signals through the retransmission of those signals
over other services, because the broadcast signals are considered a
copyrighted "compilation" of audiovisual works. 4 In accordance with this
right, and with limited exceptions, anyone who seeks to retransmit the
signal of an over-the-air broadcast station must first seek permission from
the broadcast station prior to doing so. This results in a negotiated
copyright "license" to make a copy of the signal for that purpose. By way
of contrast, a non-negotiated, "statutory" license (also called a "compulsory
license," because the copyright owner is "compelled" to provide the
license) allows the licensee to retransmit the signals of broadcast television
stations without having to negotiate for copyright permission with each
television station it carries. 5
After passage of SHVA, disputes regarding the eligibility of
subscribers to receive distant television signals soon swept the nation. In
1998, several federal courts found that the satellite industry had
systematically violated the terms of its statutory copyright license by
signing up ineligible subscribers. 6 As a result, injunctions were ordered
that would have terminated subscriber access to satellite signals if the
subscribers did not qualify under the "unserved household" definition.
17
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 119 (1994).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (listing audiovisual works as copyrightable); id. § 103
(stating that copyright inheres in compilation works); id. § 101 (defining a compilation work
as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship").
15. Id. 88 111, 119; id. § 122 (Supp. V 1999). Note that the Communications Act
separately requires a cable programmer or other multichannel video distributor who wishes
to retransmit the signal of a broadcast television station to obtain the consent of that station
through "retransmission consent." 47 U.S.C.A. § 325(b) (West. Supp. 2000). This process is
distinct from obtaining copyright clearances pursuant to copyright law, but is arguably
related to it. Although commercial television stations have the right to grant retransmission
consent, public television stations do not. Id. § 325(b)(2)(A).
16. See, e.g., Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. NBC, Inc., 219 F.3d 92, 97-98 (2d Cir.
2000) (noting that satellite carriers have engaged in a pattern or practice of infringing on
network copyrights); CBS Broad., Inc. v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1342
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (findings of fact and conclusions of law).
17. See CBS Broad., Inc. v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20488
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (final judgment and permanent injunction); ABC, Inc. v. Primetime 24
Joint Venture, 17 F. Supp. 2d 467 (M.D.N.C. 1998), 17 F. Supp. 2d 478 (M.D.N.C. 1998)
(summary judgment granted for plaintiff and permanent injunction issued), aff'd in part, 184
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In 1999, SHVIA addressed these concerns by extending the statutory
copyright license for distant signals for another five years 8 and by
amending the license in several respects. One notable way SHVIA
amended the license was to "grandfather" those subscribers who would
have had their eligibility for DBS signals terminated as a result of court
injunctions. Other modifications included deleting waiting periods for
eligibility and specifying signal measurement methodologies and complaint
procedures.' 9 SHVIA retained the restriction, however, that a DBS service
provider may only deliver a distant "network" station to an "unserved"
household that could not otherwise receive this signal over the air.20 In
addition, SHVIA retained the definition of "unserved household" as a
household that cannot receive a Grade-B signal from a local network
affiliate by use of a conventional, stationary, outdoor rooftop antenna.
21
F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 1999).
18. Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-521, Title I, Sec. 1003.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
20. Id. A "network station" is defined in part to include any
television broadcast station, including any translator station ... that rebroadcasts
all or substantially all of the programming broadcast by a network station, that is
owned and operated by, or affiliated with, one or more of the television networks
in the United States which offer an interconnected program service on a regular
basis for 15 or more hours per week to at least 25 of its affiliated television
licensees in 10 or more States.
Id. § 119(d)(2)(A). Because this part of the definition does not describe public television
stations, which are neither owned nor operated by a television network, the definition
specifically provides that a "network station" also includes "a noncommercial educational
broadcast station (as defined in section 397 of the Communications Act of 1934)." Id. §
119(d)(2)(B).
Additionally, under the distant license, a DBS service provider may also deliver certain
stations, called "superstations," to all households, regardless of their ability to receive these
signals over the air. Compare id. § 119(a)(1) with id. § 119(a)(2). "The term 'superstation'
means a television broadcast station, other than a network station, licensed by the Federal
Communications Commission that is secondarily transmitted by a satellite carrier," id
§l 19(d)(9)(A), and includes "KTLA-TV (Los Angeles), KWGN-TV (Denver), WPIX-TV
(New York), WWOR-TV (New York), WGN-TV (Chicago), and WSBK-TV (Boston)."
FCC, Fact Sheet, Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, para. 20, at
http:/www.fcc.gov/csb/shvalshviafac.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2001). The Public
Broadcasting Service ("PBS") national satellite feed is also considered a "superstation,"
except for purposes of computing the royalty fee. 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(9)(B). The license that
allows DBS service providers to retransmit the PBS national feed expires on January 1,
2002. Id. § 119(a)(1).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10)(A). In addition, some households may be eligible for a
waiver, despite receiving a signal of Grade-B intensity from the relevant station. Id. §
119(d)(10)(B). To receive a waiver, a potential DBS subscriber must first submit his request
to the DBS service provider, who then forwards the request to the local network television
station, which asserted that retransmission was prohibited. The local network television
station has thirty days from the date that it receives the waiver request to either grant or
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Responding to the nationwide litigation, while at the same time
providing a way to indirectly regulate increasing cable rates, SHVIA also
created an incentive for the DBS service to evolve from its role of merely
delivering distant network signals to unserved households to its current
status of potentially competing with cable in the delivery of both
multichannel programming and local broadcast programming.22 To
accomplish this end, SHVIA amended both the Copyright Act of 1976
("Copyright Act")2' and the Communications Act of 1934
("Communications Act").24
For the first time, SHVIA granted to DBS carriers the permanent right
to retransmit the signals of local stations into their own local designated
market areas ("DMAs")25 without seeking the permission of the local
deny the request. If the local network television station does not issue a decision within
thirty days, the request for a waiver is considered granted, and the DBS service provider
may provide the signal. 47 U.S.C.A. § 339(c)(2) (West Supp. 2000).
If a waiver is denied, the potential DBS subscriber can submit a request to the
satellite company to have a signal strength test performed at the subscriber's location to
determine whether the subscriber is receiving a signal of at least Grade-B intensity. Id. §
339(c)(4). The satellite company and relevant television broadcast station will then select a
qualified, independent person to conduct the signal test. Id. The test must be provided no
later than thirty days after the subscriber submits his request for a test. Id. If the satellite
company and TV station cannot agree on who is to conduct the signal test, SHVIA requires
the parties to use an independent, neutral entity selected by the FCC. Id. § 339(c)(4)(B). The
entity selected is the American Radio Relay League. Establishment of an Improved Model
for Predicting the Broad. Television Field Strength Received at Individual Locations, First
Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,118, para. 23, 20 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 574 (2000). The
definition of "unserved household" also creates some exemptions for owners of certain
recreational vehicles and commercial trucks, 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10)(D) (Supp. V 1999), as
well as for certain C-band subscribers. Id. § 119(d)(10)(E).
22. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of Conference on H.R. 1554, 106th
Cong., 145 Cong. Rec. at Hi1,792 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1999) [hereinafter Joint Explanatory
Statement].
23. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (Oct. 19, 1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et
seq. (1994)).
24. 48 Stat. 1064 (June 19, 1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 122(a) (Supp. V 1999). See also 47 U.S.C.A. § 339(a)(1)(B) (West
Supp. 2000) ("[A]ny satellite carrier may also provide service under the statutory license of
section 122 of title 17, United States Code, to the local market within which such household
is located."). A DMA, or "'designated market area' means a designated market area, as
determined by Nielsen Media Research and published in the 1999-2000 Nielsen Station
Index Director and Nielsen Station Index United States Television Household Estimates or
any successor publication." 17 U.S.C. § 122(j)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1999). A noncommercial
station's DMA includes "any station that is licensed to a community within the same
designated market area as the noncommercial educational television broadcast station," and
also includes the county in which the station's community of license is located. Id. §
122(j)(2)(A)-(B). See also FCC Broad. Radio Servs., 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(e) (2000);
Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999; Broad. Signal
Carriage Issues: CS Docket No. 00-96 Retransmission Consent Issues, Report and Order,
app. B, 22 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 655 (2000) [hereinafter DBS Order].
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stations in advance and without being required to pay royalties in the usual
26
manner associated with a statutory copyright license. In exchange for this
"local-into-local," royalty-free, statutory copyright license, Congress
required that, by January 1, 2002, if a satellite carrier carries at least one
local signal in a market pursuant to the license, it must upon request carry
all local broadcast stations' analog signals in that market. Section 338 as
amended by SHVIA, states:
[E]ach satellite carrier providing, under section 122 of title 17, United
States Code, secondary transmissions to subscribers located within the
local market of a television broadcast station of a primary transmission
made by that station shall carry upon request the signals of all
television broadcast stations located within that local market, subject to
section 325(b).27
Thus, as Congress has clarified, the statutory copyright license is
28
conditioned upon satisfying certain carriage obligations.
Under copyright law, however, satellite carriers are not required to
use the new statutory copyright license. Use of the license is strictly
voluntary, because in lieu of using the statutory copyright license (or prior
to January 1, 2002, when the statutory license becomes effective), a
satellite carrier may obtain copyright clearances from each local
commercial broadcast station before retransmitting the signals of those
stations on its DBS system. As Congress explained:
Satellite carriers remain free to carry any programming for which they
are able to acquire the property rights. The provisions of this Act allow
carriers an easier and more inexpensive way to obtain the right to use
the property of copyright holders when they retransmit signals from all
of a market's broadcast stations to subscribers in that market. The
26. 17 U.S.C. § 122(c).
27. 47 U.S.C.A. § 338(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000). The local-into-local statutory copyright
license does not apply to the retransmission of low-power or television translator stations,
17 U.S.C. § 122(j)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1999), nor does the must-carry provision, which is
triggered by the use of the license, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 325(b)(7)(B), 338(h)(7). The must-carry
provision is silent regarding the carriage of digital broadcast signals, as distinguished from
analog broadcast signals. The FCC has stated that it will consider the digital carriage
obligations of satellite carriers and cable operators in a separate proceeding. DBS Order,
supra note 25, par. 123.
On January 23, 2001, the FCC released an Order in which it established cable carriage
rules for the digital signals of broadcast stations, but again deferred consideration of the
issue of digital carriage on satellite systems. Carriage of Digital Television Broad. Signals:
Amendments to Part 76 of the Commission's Rules; Implementation of the Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, para. 136, 2001 WL 55621 (F.C.C.) (Jan. 23, 2001).
28. "The conference report added the cross-reference to section 122 to the House
provision to indicate the relationship between the benefits of the statutory license and the
carriage requirements imposed by this Act." Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 22, at
H 11,795.
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choice whether to retransmit those signals is made by carriers, not by
the Congress.29
In a separate but related provision, the Communications Act also
requires a satellite carrier wishing to retransmit the signal of a broadcast
television station to obtain the "consent of retransmission" of that station.' °
The FCC, therefore, requires all commercial stations to elect either
retransmission consent or mandatory carriage for the period beginning on
January 1, 2002."1 Underscoring the close relationship between the right of
retransmission consent under the Communications Act and the right to
negotiate copyright clearances under copyright law, however, the FCC has
significantly restricted the ability of satellite carriers to avoid local carriage
obligations by simply relying on privately negotiated copyright
32
agreements. The FCC has required that retransmission agreements with
commercial stations contain comprehensive copyright clearances from the
copyright holders (or assignees) of each of the programs, advertisements,
and music aired by the station.33 If retransmission agreements do not
29. Id. The FCC concurs with this theory:
This provision gives satellite carriers a choice. If satellite carriers provide their
subscribers with the signals of local television stations through reliance on the
statutory copyright license, they will have the obligation to carry all of the
television signals in that particular market that request carriage. If satellite carriers
provide local television signals pursuant to private copyright arrangements, the
Section 338 carriage obligations do not apply.
Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999: Broad. Signal
Carriage Issues, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,147, para. 10 (2000). See
also DBS Order, supra note 25, para. 15 ("If a satellite carrier provides local television
signals pursuant to private copyright arrangements, the Section 338 carriage obligations do
not apply.").
30. 47 U.S.C.A. § 325(b).
31. FCC Broad. Radio Servs., 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(c) (2000). Commercial stations must
elect either retransmission consent or must-carry by July 1, 2001, for the initial four-year
period commencing on January 1, 2002, and ending on December 31, 2005. Id §
76.66(c)(1). Thereafter, each election cycle lasts for a period of three years. Id. §
76.66(c)(2). Commercial stations must elect their methods of carriage prior to each of these
cycles by October 1 of the preceding year. Id § 76.66(c)(4). The statutory retransmission
consent option does not extend to public television stations, however, leaving them only
mandatory carriage rights where DBS service providers offer local-into-local service. 47
U.S.C.A. § 325(b)(2)(A). That is not to say, though, that public television stations may not
negotiate the terms and conditions of carriage, but only that such stations may not withhold
their signals from carriage. If it is in a market where local-into-local service is provided, a
noncommercial station must request mandatory carriage by July 1, 2001, for the first
election cycle, which lasts for four years until December 31, 2005. 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(c)(5).
Thereafter, a noncommercial station must request carriage every three years on the same
date that commercial stations must elect either retransmission consent or must-carry, i.e., by
October 1 preceding the year in which the election cycle commences. Id.
32. DBS Order, supra note 25, para. 15.
33. Id.
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contain such comprehensive terms, then the satellite carrier involved is still
subject to must-carry requirements.34 Nevertheless, the choice still rests
with satellite carriers as to the preferred method of carriage. They may
select either must-carry, with its basic obligation to carry all local stations
in that market, or they may choose to negotiate with each local station for
carriage and for comprehensive copyright clearances.
In addition to the basic carriage obligation, SHVIA also imposes a
variety of other duties in exchange for the use of the statutory license, with
the aim of equalizing the regulatory treatment of satellite and cable.35 These
duties are set out in SHVIA and further elaborated upon by FCC
regulations that became effective on January 23, 2001. 3' First, satellite
carriers must construct and designate local uplink facilities in each
designated market in which local service is provided, so that local
broadcast stations can deliver their signals for distribution over the DBS
system; alternatively, satellite carriers can construct an uplink facility that
is acceptable to at least half of the stations asserting the right to carriage.1
7
In exchange, the broadcast station asserting its carriage rights is responsible
for, and must bear the costs of, providing a "good quality signal" to the
uplink facility.38 Second, satellite carriers are not required to carry
duplicative commercial stations in the same market, nor must they carry
more than one local station affiliated with the same network, unless such
stations are licensed to communities in different states.39 A satellite carrier
must carry all non-duplicative noncommercial stations, however, in
markets where it provides local-into-local service.4 Third, DBS systems
34. Id.
35. "A secondary transmission of a performance or display of a work embodied in a
primary transmission of a television broadcast station into the station's local market shall be
subject to statutory licensing under this section if... (2) with regard to secondary
transmissions, the satellite carrier is in compliance with the rules, regulations, or
authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission governing the carriage of
television broadcast station signals ...." 17 U.S.C.A. § 122(a) (West Supp. 2000).
36. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.66, as added by DBS Order, supra note 25. This Order became
effective immediately on publication in the Federal Register on January 23, 2001.
Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999: Broad. Signal
Carriage Issues/Retransmission Consent Issues, 66 Fed. Reg. 7410 (Jan. 23,2001).
37. 47 U.S.C.A. § 338(b) (West Supp. 2000); 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(f).
38. 47 U.S.C.A. § 338(b); 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(g).
39. 47 U.S.C.A. § 338(c)(1). See also 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(h). "A commercial television
station substantially duplicates the programming of another commercial television station if
it simultaneously broadcasts the identical programming of another station for more than 50
percent of the broadcast week." Id. § 76.66(h)(6).
40. 47 U.S.C.A. § 338(c)(2); 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(h). See also DBS Order, supra note 25,
paras. 84-90. For purposes of satellite carriage, duplication occurs if, for the first three
noncommercial stations carried, a station "simultaneously broadcasts the same programming
as another noncommercial station more than 50 percent of prime time.., and more than 50
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must carry the entirety of a broadcast signal and must not degrade the
broadcast signal.4' Fourth, although satellite providers need not preserve the
channel position or channel number of a broadcast station, local broadcast
channels must be retransmitted on contiguous channels, and satellite
providers must provide access to such stations on a nondiscriminatory
basis, including, on any navigational devices, on-screen program guides, or
42
other menus. Finally, satellite providers are not allowed to accept or
request compensation for must-carry rights or channel positioning on their
systems. 43 Failure to comply with the basic carriage obligation can give rise
to a copyright complaint in federal court,44 while failure to comply with any
of the related FCC regulations can subject a satellite carrier to the FCC's
45
administrative complaint process.
As Congress explained, the purpose of the local carriage obligations
was primarily to "preserve free television for those not served by satellite
or cable systems and to promote widespread dissemination of information
percent outside of-prime time over a three month period." 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(h)(7)
(emphasis added). "[A]fter three noncommercial stations are carried, the test of duplication
[is] whether more than 50 percent of prime time programming and more than 50 percent of
non-prime time programming is duplicative on a non-simultaneous basis." Id (emphasis
added).
41. 47 U.S.C.A. § 338(g). The FCC has created regulations that add additional detail to
these provisions. Thus, satellite carriers must carry the
entirety [of] the primary video, accompanying audio, and closed captioning data
contained in line 21 of the vertical blanking interval, and to the extent technically
feasible, program-related material carried in the vertical blanking interval or on
subcarriers. For noncommercial educational television stations, a satellite carriers
must also carry any program-related material that may be necessary for receipt of
programming by persons with disabilities or for educational or language purposes.
Secondary audio programming must also be carried.
47 C.F.R. § 76.660)(1). Satellite carriers may delete signal enhancements, however, and
may carry any other auxiliary service transmission at their own discretion. Id. Regarding
nondegradation, the FCC has stated that "[e]ach local television station whose signal is
carried under mandatory carriage shall, to the extent technically feasible and consistent with
good engineering practice, be provided with the same quality of signal processing provided
to television stations electing retransmission consent." Id. § 76.66(k). Satellite carriers are
permitted to use reasonable compression techniques, however, when carrying local
television stations. Id.
42. 47 U.S.C.A. § 338(d); 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(i).
43. 47 U.S.C.A. § 338(e); 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(1).
44. 47 U.S.C.A. § 338(a)(2) ("The remedies for any failure to meet the obligations
under this subsection shall be available exclusively under section 501(f) of title 17, United
States Code."). Section 501(f)(2) of the Copyright Act authorizes a television broadcast
station to "file a civil action against any satellite carrier" that has refused to carry the
station's signal, as required under the compulsory license and must-carry provisions of
sections 122(a)(2) of the Copyright Act and 338(a) of the Communications Act. 17 U.S.C. §
501(f)(2) (1994).
45. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 338(f) (West Supp. 2000); 47 C.F.R. § 76.66(m).
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from a multiplicity of sources.' 46 Congress stated that to accomplish these
ends, it was necessary to prevent satellite carriers from choosing only
certain stations for carriage. 47 In addition, Congress carefully constructed
the license to place satellite carriers in a comparable position to cable
systems competing for the same customers. Congress concluded that
"[a]pplying a must-carry rule in markets which satellite carriers choose to
serve benefits consumers and enhances competition with cable by allowing
consumers the same range of choice in local programming they receive
through cable service. ''48 Exercising its power to legislate prospectively
based on its predictive capabilities,49 Congress anticipated that by 2002, the
market share of satellite carriers would have increased and "Congress'[s]
interest in maintaining free over-the-air television will be undermined if
local broadcasters are prevented from reaching viewers by either cable or
satellite distribution systems."50
Through the mechanism of the statutory copyright license, Congress
gave satellite carriers a voluntary and economic benefit to assist them in
competing with cable, while at the same time imposing obligations similar
to those faced by the cable companies. Congress was also aware of the
dangers of increased satellite carrier market power, however, and,
therefore, it carefully constructed a remedy to ensure the preservation of
free, over-the-air television and to promote the widespread dissemination
of information from a multiplicity of sources.
IRI. SHVIA's CONSTITUTIONAL GEOGRAPHY
On September 20, 2000, the Satellite Broadcasting and
Communications Association ("SBCA"), DirecTV, and EchoStar filed a
lawsuit in the Eastern District of Virginia challenging the constitutionality
46. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 22, at HI 1,795.
47. Id.
Providing the proposed license on a market-by-market basis furthers both goals by
preventing satellite carriers from choosing to carry only certain stations and
effectively preventing many other local broadcasters from reaching potential
viewers in their service areas. The Conference Committee is concerned that,
absent must-carry obligations, satellite carriers would carry the major network
affiliates and few other signals. Non-carried stations would face the same loss of
viewership Congress previously found with respect to cable noncarriage.
Id.
48. Id.
49. "[S]ound policymaking often requires legislators to forecast future events and to
anticipate the likely impact of these events based on deductions and inferences for which
complete empirical support may be unavailable." Time-Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d
957, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665
(1994) ("Tumerr')).
50. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 22, at HI 1,795.
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of § 338 on First Amendment free speech grounds." On February 9, 2001,
the court held oral arguments on various motions to dismiss. 2 In addition,
the SBCA and EchoStar each separately appealed the FCC's newly created
regulations in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, and Tenth Circuits
respectively.5 ' The SBCA claimed that the statute violates the satellite
carriers' First Amendment free speech rights on the basis of seven separate
theories. First, the SBCA alleged that the statute interferes with satellite
carriers' protected editorial discretion. 4 Second, the SBCA alleged that §
338 penalizes satellite carriers for engaging in certain kinds of protected
speech.55 Third, the SBCA claimed that the statute makes a content-based
preference for independent, local television broadcast programming over
56
other forms of video programming and programming services. Fourth, the
SBCA alleged that § 338 constitutes speaker-based discrimination by
increasing the relative voice of a certain class of speakers to the detriment
51. See Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Satellite Broad. and Comms.
Ass'n of Am. v. FCC (E.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2000) (No. 00-1571-A) [hereinafter Complaint].
The SBCA also claimed that SHVIA took property without just compensation or due
process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In support of this claim, the SBCA argued that
the law requires the satellite carriers "to purchase or lease additional real property and to
purchase, lease, and/or construct additional facilities, including local receive facilities,
backhaul facilities, uplink center capability, satellite capability, and spectrum rights." Id.
para. 94. In addition, the SBCA claimed that the statute "works a permanent physical
occupation of the real property, personal property, spectrum rights, and other property" of
satellite carriers by requiring third parties to install equipment that is physically
interconnected with DBS systems. Id. para. 96. Therefore, the SBCA alleged that this
constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. para. 99. In addition, the SBCA also argued that Congress lacked the
authority to create the law under the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. It argued that the
copyright power granted to Congress is limited to the promotion of creative endeavors
generally and does not extend to Congress the power to use copyright law to promote works
of particular varieties or by particular authors. Id. para. 87. Both of these claims lie beyond
the scope of this Article.
52. See Court to Hear Must-Carry Motions, SKYREPORT (Feb. 9, 2001), at http://www.
skyreport.com/skyreport/feb200l/020901.htm#one; Court to Review Must-Carry Motions,
SKYREPORT (Feb. 12, 2001), at http://www.skyreport.com/feb200l/021201.htm#one.
53. See Pet. for Review, EchoStar Satellite Corp. v. FCC, (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2001) (No.
01-9503); Pet. for Review, Satellite Broad. and Comms. Ass'n v. FCC (4th Cir. Feb. 1,
2001) (No. 01-1151). The National Association of Broadcasters has also appealed a portion
of the new regulations in the D.C. Circuit on the basis that the challenged portion is arbitrary
and capricious and otherwise contrary to law. Pet. for Review, Nat'l Ass'n of Broads. v.
FCC (No. 01-1050) (D.C. Cir. Feb. 1, 2001). By order dated February 9, 2001, the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these appeals in the Fourth Circuit. See
Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999; Broad. Signal
Carriage Issues, Retransmission Consent Issues, Order, No. RTC-57, FCC 00-417 (Feb. 9,
2001).
54. Complaint, supra note 51, para. 75.
55. Id. para. 76.
56. Id. para. 77.
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of other speakers. Fifth, the SBCA claimed that the statute unlawfully
forces satellite carriers to display and associate themselves with the speech
of others.58 Sixth, the SBCA claimed that the statute dictates the content of
satellite carriers' own speech by dictating the manner in which on-screen
programming guides and menus must present local broadcast television
stations. 9 Lastly, the SBCA claimed that the statute violates the First
Amendment rights not only of the satellite carriers, but also of national and
regional cable programmers, network-affiliated local television broadcast
stations, and subscribers to DBS services.60
• 61
With limited exceptions, content-based governmental restrictions on
speech are reviewed under strict scrutiny and thus must be justified by
compelling state interests and be narrowly tailored to accomplish those
interests.62 By way of contrast, content-neutral limitations on speech
receive intermediate scrutiny,63 requiring only an important governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of speech and means no greater than
necessary to further that interest. 4 It has long been established that a less
65
rigorous level of scrutiny applies to the regulation of broadcast media,
however, allowing some limited content restraints as well as certain
66
affirmative obligations on broadcast licensees. For instance, for content
neutral governmental restrictions on broadcast speech, the Supreme Court
has applied rational basis scrutiny, requiring means that are only rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest.67 On the other hand, where the
government imposes content-based restrictions on broadcast speech, the
Supreme Court has typically used a form of intermediate scrutiny also
57. Id. para. 78.
58. Id. para. 79.
59. Id. para. 80.
60. Id. para. 84.
61. The exceptions include cases where there is a clear and present danger of imminent
lawless action, Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); obscenity, Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S.
476 (1957); and defamation, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
62. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105 (1991); TurnerI, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
63. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 642 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288,293 (1984)).
64. Id. at 662 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) and United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
65. Id. at 637 (comparing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(television), and NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (radio), with Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (print), and Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of
N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (personal solicitation)).
66. Id. at 638 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 390).
67. Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. 367; NBC, 319 U.S. 190. See also Time-Wamer
Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 976-77 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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associated with "time, place, and manner" restrictions, content-neutral
regulation of cable, and the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence.
The following section describes this dual aspect of constitutional broadcast
jurisprudence.
A. Content-Neutral Regulation of Broadcasting: Rational Basis
Scrutiny
In 1943, the Supreme Court in NBC v. United States upheld several
FCC regulations, promulgated pursuant to the FCC's power to regulate
broadcasting in "the public interest," that imposed restrictions on the ability
of broadcasters to create contracts with networks-i.e., "chain
broadcasting. 6 ' Responding to a challenge to the FCC's statutory
authority, the Court held that the Communications Act did not limit the
FCC's role simply to ensuring noninterference between stations, but rather
it gave the FCC expansive powers to regulate in the public interest. ° The
Court then turned to a First Amendment challenge and reasoned that, given
the unique characteristics of broadcasting, the medium was subject to
government regulation. 7' The Court concluded that "the right of free speech
does not include.., the right to use the facilities of radio without a
license,, 72 giving the impression that federal restrictions on the free speech
of broadcast licensees were subject to what we would now call rational
basis scrutiny. The Court was careful to note, however, that the regulations
at issue were content-neutral in nature, and that if future regulations were
viewpoint-specific, the analysis would be wholly different:
68. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999);
Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993);
Ward, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
69. 319 U.S. 190.
70. Id. at215-16.
The Act itself establishes that the Commission's powers are not limited to the
engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio communication. Yet we
are asked to regard the Commission as a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave
lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other. But the Act does not
restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the
Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic. The
facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them.
Methods must be devised for choosing from among the many who apply. And
since Congress could not do this, it committed the task to the Commission.
Id.
71. Id. at 226. "Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to
all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is
subject to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use
it must be denied." Id
72. Id. at 227.
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Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among
applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or social views,
or upon any other capricious basis. If it did, or if the Commission by
these Regulations proposed a choice among applicants upon some such
basis, the issue before us would be wholly different.
In 1969, the Supreme Court developed this rationale further when it
upheld the FCC's now repealed "fairness doctrine ' 74 and the related
personal attack75 and political editorial rules76 under a relaxed standard of
review approaching rational basis scrutiny. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, the Supreme Court held that the unique nature of the medium,
specifically the scarcity of electromagnetic spectrum, required the licensing
authority to ensure that the broadcast spectrum was used productively to
serve the public interest.78 Reflecting on the historically documented chaos
that had resulted from unregulated radio use prior to the Radio Act of 1927
and the Communications Act,79 the Court noted that this state of affairs was
directly analogous to the scenario of a powerful person drowning out the
voices of the less powerful."s
73. Id. at 226.
74. Established in 1949 by the FCC, the fairness doctrine required that licensees devote
a reasonable percentage of their broadcasting time to the discussion of public issues of
interest in the community and that such programs be designed so that the public has a
reasonable opportunity to hear different opposing positions. Editorializing by Broad.
Licensees, Report of the Commission, 13 F.C.C. 1246, par. 21 (1949). The purpose of the
doctrine was to ensure a well-informed electorate through the balanced expression of
diverse viewpoints in a scarce medium.
75. The personal attack rule stated that when, during the presentation of views on a
"controversial issue of public importance," an attack is made upon the "honesty, character,
integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group," the broadcaster must
notify the person attacked, and provide a tape or transcript of the attack, within one week
and offer a "reasonable opportunity to respond." 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(a), repealed by 65
Fed. Reg. 66,643, 66,644 (Nov. 7, 2000).
76. The political editorial rule provided that, if a broadcast licensee runs an editorial
supporting a legally qualified candidate for elective office, the licensee must inform all other
qualified candidates of the editorial and provide a reasonable opportunity for those
candidates to respond. Id. § 73.1930, repealed by 65 Fed. Reg. 66,643, 66,644 (Nov. 7,
2000).
77. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
78. Id. at 390.
79. Id. at 375. "Before 1927, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the
private sector, and the result was chaos." Id.
80. Recognizing the "massive reality" of the problem of interference, the Court stated:
The lack of know-how and equipment may keep many from the air, but only a tiny
fraction of those with resources and intelligence can hope to communicate by
radio at the same time if intelligible communication is to be had, even if the entire
radio spectrum is utilized in the present state of commercially acceptable
technology. It was this fact, and the chaos which ensued from permitting anyone
to use any frequency at whatever power level he wished, which made necessary
the enactment of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934.
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Consequently, the Court concluded that "[w]here there are
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment
right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak,
write, or publish."'" Therefore, Red Lion established that, with regard to
broadcasting and the First Amendment, "[i]t is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
'82
In rendering its decision, the Red Lion Court had two concerns. First,
the Court was concerned that governmental regulation and normalization of
the medium was necessary to cultivate a fertile environment for free
speech. Therefore, regulation served the structural purpose of maintaining
those conditions necessary for free speech to thrive.83 Second, the Court
was concerned with the possibility of more powerful persons being able to
monopolize the marketplace of ideas to the detriment of the less powerful.
84Preventing such domination also promoted the free exchange of ideas.
The Court was careful to emphasize, however, that despite the
importance of a governmental oversight of the conditions of free
expression, the Communications Act itself forbade the federal government
from censoring programming." Indeed, the Court specifically stated that if
the regulations at issue were content-specific, a more serious constitutional
Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 388 (citing NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-
14 (1943)). The Court analogized to nuisance law, stating:
Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying equipment
potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech, so may the
Government limit the use of broadcast equipment. The right of free speech of a
broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a
right to snuff out the free speech of others.
Id. at 387 (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 388.
82. Id. at 390.
83. It is this structural perspective that the Court had in mind when it stated:
[Tjhe people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and
purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
Id. at 390.
84. "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of
that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee." Id.
85. Id. at 382 n.12 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1994)).
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by
any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by
the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of
radio communication.
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review would have ensued.86
In 1996, in Time-Warner v. FCC,87 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
built upon these foundations when it upheld against a First Amendment
challenge section 25 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Act")8 8 and the FCC's implementing
regulations. 9 The Act and its corresponding regulations required DBS
service providers to set aside four percent of their national channel capacity
for national providers of noncommercial, educational, and informational
programming.90 The court held that, because of the scarcity of orbital slots
and available frequencies, the statute and regulations were to be evaluated
by using the broadcast standard of scrutiny announced in Red Lion.9'
After setting forth the appropriate constitutional standard, the D.C.
Circuit examined the governmental interest involved, which was to
"promote the availability to the public of a diversity of views and
information through cable television and other video distribution media,"
an interest which it concluded lay "at the core of the First Amendment.
' 92
The court then examined the means chosen to effectuate this interest,
stating that "either empirical support or at least sound reasoning" must be
marshaled in support of measures that may incidentally affect First
86. Id. at 396.
We need not and do not now ratify every past and future decision by the FCC with
regard to programming. There is no question here of the Commission's refusal to
permit the broadcasters to carry a particular program or to publish his own views;
of a discriminatory refusal to require the licensee to broadcast certain views which
have been denied access to the airwaves; of government censorship of a particular
program contrary to § 326; or of the official government view dominating public
broadcasting. Such questions would raise more serious First Amendment issues
Id.
87. Time-Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 976-77 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
88. 47 U.S.C. § 335(b) (1994).
89. FCC Safety and Radio Servs., 47 C.F.R. § 100.5(c) (2000). See also
Implementation of Section 25 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992; Direct Broad. Satellite Pub. Interest Obligations, Report and
Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 23,254, 14 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 290 (1998).
90. 47 C.F.R. § 100.5(c)(1).
91. Time-Warner, 93 F.3d at 975.
The Supreme Court recognized, in 1969, that because of the limited availability of
the radio spectrum for broadcast purposes, "only a tiny fraction of those with
resources and intelligence can hope to communicate by radio at the same
time."... The same is true for DBS today. Because the United States has only a
finite number of satellite positions available for DBS use, the opportunity to
provide such services will necessarily be limited. Even before the first DBS
communications satellite was launched in 1994, the FCC found that "the demand
for channel/orbit allocations far exceeds the available supply."
Id (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 976.
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Amendment interests.93 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that, although Congress
made no specific findings in support of the noncommercial set-aside, it was
not required to do so, given that no DBS system was in operation at the
time the 1992 Act was enacted and that Congress may make "deductions
and inferences for which complete empirical support may be
unavailable., 94 The court reasoned further that the set-aside represented
"nothing more than a new application of a well-settled government policy
of ensuring public access to noncommercial programming" achieved
through means that imposed little burden on the DBS operators.95
Importantly, in applying the broadcast standard of constitutional
review, the D.C. Circuit noted that the set-aside was content-neutral. It held
that the set-aside did not require or prohibit the carriage of particular ideas
or points of view, penalize DBS operators or programmers based on the
content of their programming, compel DBS operators to affirm points of
view with which they disagree, or produce any net decrease in the amount
of available speech, and left DBS operators free to carry whatever
programming they wished on all channels not subject to the set-aside
requirements.96 Because the purpose of the set-aside was to promote speech
and not to restrict it, the court concluded that it was a "reasonable means of
promoting the public interest" and did not violate the First Amendment. 97
Therefore, building upon the precedent established in Red Lion and NBC,
the D.C. Circuit implicitly used the rational basis test to uphold a content-
neutral regulation of broadcasting as constitutional.
B. Content-Based Broadcast Regulation: Intermediate Scrutiny
By contrast, when the Supreme Court has evaluated content-based
restrictions on broadcasting, the Court has typically applied intermediate
scrutiny. In FCC v. League of Women Voters, the Supreme Court struck
down a content-based ban on editorializing by noncommercial broadcast
licensees, holding that content-based restrictions on broadcast operations
would be upheld only if the restrictions were "narrowly tailored to further a
93. Id. (quoting Century Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
94. Id. (quoting TurnerI, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)).
"Congress is not obligated, when enacting its statutes, to make a record of the type
that an administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial review....
"[S]ound policymaking often requires legislators to forecast future events and to
anticipate the likely impact of these events based on deductions and inferences for
which complete empirical support may be unavailable."
Id. (quoting Turner!, 512 U.S. at 665-66).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 977 (citing Turner !, 512 U.S. at 647).
97. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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substantial government interest."98 Thus, the Court examined the statute
under a form of intermediate scrutiny usually associated with the
examination of content-neutral "time, place, and manner" restrictions,"
restrictions on nonbroadcast speech by cable operators,' °° or content-neutral
restrictions on commercial speech.'01
In League of Women Voters, the Court built upon the foundation laid
by Red Lion and sought to clarify "the essential meaning of [its] prior
decisions concerning the reach of Congress' authority to regulate broadcast
communication,"' 02 emphasizing that "the First Amendment must inform
and give shape to the manner in which Congress exercises its regulatory
power in this area."10' The Court reviewed various broadcast content
controls-including decisions involving both the reasonable access
requirements of § 312(a)(7)'04 and time, place, and manner restrictions on
indecent material105--and concluded that content-based restrictions on
broadcast operations had been upheld "only when the Court was satisfied
that the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial government
interest."'' 0 6 The Court identified two governmental interests in support of
the ban on editorializing-protecting noncommercial stations from
becoming vehicles for government propaganda and preventing those
stations from being captured by private interest groups bent on expressing
partisan views'°7-and concluded that even if these interests were
substantial, the means chosen to accomplish them were both underinclusive
and overinclusive and thus not sufficiently "narrowly tailored."'0 8 By
98. 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984). In analyzing the ban on editorializing, the Court found
that the restriction was content-based in two respects. First, the restriction was "specifically
directed at a form of speech-namely, the expression of editorial opinion-that lies at the
heart of First Amendment protection." Id. at 381. Second, the scope of the ban was defined
solely by the content of the suppressed speech, for "in order to determine whether a
particular statement by station management constitutes an 'editorial' proscribed by [section]
399, enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the message that is
conveyed to determine whether the views expressed concern 'controversial issues of public
importance."' Id. at 383.
99. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781 (1989).
100. See Turnerl, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
101. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999);
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, of N.Y. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
102. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376.
103. Id. at 378.
104. Id. at 378-79 (citing CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981)).
105. Id. at 380 n. 13 (citing Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 726).
106. Id. at 380.
107. Id. at 384-85.
108. Id. at 395-99.
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requiring that content-based restrictions on broadcast operations be
"narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest," the Court
apparently applied the intermediate standard of scrutiny typically used
when examining content-neutral "time, place, and manner" restrictions on
nonbroadcast speech.'0 9 Although the phrase "narrow tailoring" is typically
associated with strict scrutiny, it has also been applied in the intermediate
scrutiny context to mean something less than a perfect match between ends
and means." ° Therefore, the use of narrow tailoring is consistent with
intermediate scrutiny.
Intermediate scrutiny was also used by the Supreme Court to evaluate
content-neutral regulations of nonbroadcast speech within the cable
context. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC ("Turner I"), the
Supreme Court upheld a statute that required cable systems to carry the
signals of local broadcast stations." At the outset of the Turner I opinion,
the Court noted that the rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of
First Amendment scrutiny to cases of broadcast regulation did not apply in
109. Id. at 380. See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,798 (1989). ("Lest
any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, or
manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate,
content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means
of doing so."); see also Turner !, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). For variants on the intermediate
standard of scrutiny as it applies to cases of sex discrimination, see United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (stating that the law must "serve[] 'important
governmental objectives"' and the means employed must be "'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives') (citations omitted). In Cmty.-Serv. Broad. of Mid-Am.,
Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc), however, a plurality of the D.C.
Circuit applied strict scrutiny to invalidate a federal statute requiring public broadcasters to
retain and make available recordings of all broadcasts when any issue of public importance
is discussed. The court held that this statute was content-based broadcast regulation and thus
constitutional only if "essential to a compelling governmental interest." Id. at I 111. The
court also questioned the applicability of Red Lion in cases of content-based broadcast
regulation, stating, "Certainly spectrum scarcity cannot be invoked to support a government
attempt to penalize or suppress speech, based on its general content." Id. at 1111 n.21
(plurality opinion).
110. For instance, the Supreme Court has concluded that within the context of
intermediate scrutiny, narrow tailoring "need not be the least speech-restrictive means of
advancing the Government's interests," but is satisfied if the regulation "'promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation."' Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). In other words, in
the context of intermediate scrutiny, narrow tailoring requires only that the "means chosen
do not 'burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's
legitimate interests."' Id. See also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States,
527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (describing "narrow tailoring" in the intermediate scrutiny context
as "'a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served."')
(quoting Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
111. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 643 (upholding 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. IV 1998) (commercial
must-carry), and 47 U.S.C. § 535 (noncommercial must-carry)).
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the context of cable regulation. ' 2 It held that the statute did not distinguish
favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views
expressed." 3 Rather, it was merely a content-neutral regulation designed
"to prevent cable operators from exploiting their economic power to the
detriment of broadcasters, and thereby to ensure that all Americans,
especially those unable to subscribe to cable, have access to free television
programming-whatever its content."' 4 Consequently, the Court applied
an intermediate level of scrutiny, which would uphold the statute, provided
that it furthered an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of free speech and that any incidental restrictions on
speech did not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further
those interests."
5
The Court found that the must-carry policy was designed to further
three interrelated and important governmental interests identified by
Congress: "(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast
television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from
a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market
for television programming."' 6 The Court was unable to determine whether
cable must-carry was narrowly tailored to further important governmental
interests, however, and remanded the issue to the district court for further
factual development.17
Three years later, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
conclusion in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC ("Turner I"') that
cable must-carry was narrowly tailored to further important governmental
interests." 8 The Court first held that the record supported Congress's
predictive judgment that the must-carry provisions furthered important
governmental interests." 9 In evaluating whether a substantial or direct
relationship existed between the interests identified and the means chosen,
the Court noted that its inquiry was limited to whether Congress reached
reasonable conclusions supported by substantial evidence, rather than
reweighing the evidence or substituting its own judgment for that of
Congress. The Court then concluded that the means chosen did not
112. Id. at 638-39.
113. Id. at 643.
114. Id. at 649.
115. Id. at 662 (citations omitted).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 665.
118. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
119. Id. at 213.
120. Id. at 199.
The Constitution gives to Congress the role of weighing conflicting evidence in
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burden substantially more speech than was necessary to further those
interests.12 In making this determination, the Court reaffirmed that under
intermediate scrutiny, content-neutral regulations are not "'invalid simply
because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome
on speech."",1
22
The standard announced in League of Women Voters also bears strong
similarity to the intermediate level of scrutiny used in cases of commercial
speech regulation.12 In fact, without citing either Red Lion or its progeny,
the Supreme Court applied commercial speech jurisprudence in a case
involving a content-based restriction on broadcasting, holding that
intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, applies in cases of content-based
broadcast restrictions on speech. ,24 In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
Association v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal
statute that forbade broadcasters from carrying advertising about privately
operated commercial casino gambling, regardless of the station's or
casino's location. 12 In examining the validity of this content-based
restriction on broadcast speech, the Court used the Central Hudson four-
the legislative process. Even when the resulting regulation touches on First
Amendment concerns, we must give considerable deference, in examining the
evidence, to Congress' findings and conclusions, including its findings and
conclusions with respect to conflicting economic predictions.
Id. "The issue before us is whether, given conflicting views of the probable development of
the television industry, Congress had substantial evidence for making the judgment that it
did." Id. at 208.
The question is not whether Congress, as an objective matter, was correct to
determine must-carry is necessary to prevent a substantial number of broadcast
stations from losing cable carriage and suffering significant financial hardship.
Rather, the question is whether the legislative conclusion was reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence in the record before Congress. [citation omitted]
In making that determination, we are not to "re-weigh the evidence de novo, or to
replace Congress' factual predictions with our own."
Id. at 211 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
121. Id. at 215-16. "Because the burden imposed by must-carry is congruent to the
benefits it affords, we conclude must-carry is narrowly tailored to preserve a multiplicity of
broadcast stations for the 40 percent of American households without cable." Id.
122. Id. at 217 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). "Our
precedents establish that when evaluating a content-neutral regulation which incidentally
burdens speech, we will not invalidate the preferred remedial scheme because some
alternative solution is marginally less intrusive on a speaker's First Amendment interests."
Id. at 217-18.
123. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 430 (1993) (observing "that the
validity of time, place, or manner restrictions is determined under standards very similar to
those applicable in the commercial speech context").
124. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
125. Id. In 1993, the Supreme Court upheld this statute as it applied to broadcast
advertising of the Virginia lottery by a radio station located in North Carolina where no such
lottery was authorized. See Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418.
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part intermediate scrutiny test applicable to the regulation of commercial
speech.126 Under this test, the Court first examines whether the restricted
speech activity is "lawful" and not "misleading.', 27 If the speech is both
lawful and not misleading, the Court then examines whether the asserted
governmental interest is "substantial.' 2 If the interest is substantial, then
the Court inquires whether the regulation "'directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.', 1 29 In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting,
the Court invalidated the ban on casino gambling advertising because the
federal policy of discouraging gambling was so equivocal and "pierced by
exemptions and inconsistencies" that the broadcast ban could not directly
advance any consistently stated governmental purpose.'O
Therefore, under League of Women Voters and Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting, government-imposed, content-based restrictions on
broadcast licensees receive intermediate scrutiny, the same test used for
content-neutral regulation of nonbroadcast cable operations. Although the
Supreme Court in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting may not have relied
upon the Red Lion rationale as explicitly as it did in League of Women
Voters, by using the same standard of constitutional review, the Court
surely signaled that it was not yet willing to abandon the usefulness of that
reasoning for its broadcast jurisprudence.
C. Is Red Lion's Scarcity Doctrine Still Viable?
The Supreme Court still adheres to a lower level of constitutional
scrutiny when evaluating restrictions on broadcast speech, be they content-
neutral or content-based. The spectrum scarcity rationale articulated by the
Court in Red Lion has come under considerable attack, however, ever since
its inception.13' Despite this chorus of criticism, the scarcity doctrine seems
126. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc., 527 U.S. at 183 (quoting Cent. Hudson




130. Id. at 188-95.
131. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 638 n.5 (1994) (citing Telecomms. Research and
Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986); LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A
FREE PRESS 87-90 (1991); LUCAS A. PowE, JR., AMERIcAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 197-209 (1987); MATrHEW L. SPrTZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER
STORIES 7-18 (1986); Laurence Winer, The Signal Cable Sends-Part I: Why Can't Cable
Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. REv. 212,218-40 (1987); Note, The Message in the
Medium The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062,
1072-74 (1994)). See also RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE
ELECrRONIC MEDIA (Robert Corn-Revere ed., 1997) (surveying and criticizing potential
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to have remarkable staying power within the judiciary, and continues to
remain the law.
For instance, in Red Lion, the Court recognized that technological
advances may have limited the problem of scarcity, but the Court declined
to consider the question, arguing instead that even if this were true,
economic scarcity would suffice to justify regulation. In League of
Women Voters, the Court again refused to reconsider whether technological
innovations had eliminated the scarcity rationale underlying the FCC's
ability to regulate in the public interest, including its ability to impose
diversity requirements.' Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan noted
that although the scarcity rationale had come under some criticism, the
Court was "not prepared.., to reconsider [its] long-standing approach
without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological
developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of
broadcast regulation may be required."' 3 4 In 1985 and 1987, the FCC
arguably sent the signal sought by the Supreme Court when the
Commission issued its Fairness Report and repealed the "fairness doctrine"
on the dual grounds that the doctrine was arbitrary and that the scarcity
rationale was no longer constitutionally viable.' The FCC's opposition to
the scarcity doctrine has been less than steadfast, however, as the agency
has recently attempted to revive the importance of public interest
obligations and the scarcity doctrine under new political leadership.'1
6
theories to replace the scarcity doctrine); Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A
Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. Rn'V. 207, 221-26 (1982);
Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM.
L. REv. 905, 926-30 (1997); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First
Amendment Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1740-
41 (1995); Donald E. Lively, The Information Superhighway: A First Amendment Roadmap,
35 B.C. L. Rnv. 1067, 1081 n.121 (1994); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of
Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 990, 1013-20 (1989).
132. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,400 n.28 (1969).
133. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
134. Id. at 376 n.ll.
135. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations Concerning
the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licenses, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 142, 58
Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1137 (1985); Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Stations
WTVH Syracuse, N.Y., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 63 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 1073 (1987), recons. denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), affJd sub nom.
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
136. For instance, in response to a court order to either repeal or justify the political
editorial and personal attack doctrines, the FCC stated that the FCC, Congress, and the
courts have repudiated the "dicta" in Syracuse Peace Council that questioned the spectrum
scarcity doctrine. Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial
Rules, Order and Request to Update Record, para. 17, 2000 WL 1468707 (F.C.C.) (Oct. 4,
2000). See also Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 184 F.3d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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Moreover, in 1994, the Supreme Court again refused to overrule its Red
Lion scarcity rationale, although it did state that the alternative formulation
of the scarcity doctrine in terms of "economic scarcity" was misconceived,
because "the special physical characteristics of broadcast transmission, not
the economic characteristics of the broadcast market, are what underlies
[its] broadcast jurisprudence."' 3 7 Even as recently as 1997, the dissent in the
Time-Warner case, while reluctant to extend the broadcast jurisprudence to
the new medium of DBS, acknowledged that the Red Lion scarcity
rationale was "not in such poor shape that an intermediate court of appeals
could properly announce its death."'3 8
Critics often argue that because the "new economy" has seen a
startling explosion in the number and variety of media outlets, there is no
need to regulate the broadcast spectrum to enhance the diversity of
voices-these voices can be heard just as well over cable or the Internet.139
It is not immediately obvious, however, that even in this new economy,
spectrum scarcity does not pose a problem for free expression. For
instance, with the concentration of cable ownership, it is certainly arguable
that diversity of expression may be threatened. In addition, although the
Internet may potentially allow any man to be his own publisher, Internet
access is by no means universal, and the ability to have one's material
"found" by users is increasingly controlled by a very small number of
"gateway" search engines.
Moreover, there is a great deal of evidence that broadcast spectrum is
actually becoming more scarce because of a variety of factors. For instance,
the transitional strategy for converting all television broadcasting to a
digital format requires that each television broadcast licensee operate two
television broadcast stations-one in digital and one in analog on different
frequencies-until eighty-five percent of viewers in the relevant market are
capable of receiving digital signals, at which point the analog spectrum is
returned to the government. 140 It is anticipated by many industry observers,
however, that this period of transition will take longer than the target date
of 2006 and, indeed, may never end in some markets.14 Therefore, because
137. TurnerI, 512 U.S. 622,640 (1994).
138. Time-Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 724 n.2 (1997) (per curiam)
(Williams, J., dissenting) (denying en banc rehearing).
139. See, e.g., Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial
Rules, Order and Request to Update Record, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,973 (2000) (Powell, Comm'r,
dissenting), vacated by Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
140. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(j)(14) (West Supp. 2000).
141. See Alan Breznick, FCC Commissioners Differ Over Merger Authority, DTV
Transition, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 1, 2000, (quoting Commissioner Powell that the 2006
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of the digital transition, spectrum has actually become more scarce with
many television broadcast licensees broadcasting on additional channels for
a potentially indefinite period of time. Additionally, the growth of
terrestrial wireless telephony; wireless Internet access; wireless cable; and
satellite-delivered television, radio, data services, and telephony, has
precipitated what former Chairman Kennard termed a "spectrum
drought.' ' 42 Indeed, just as increases in computer processing power
encouraged the development of computer programs that required greater
processing resources, the development of spectrum-hungry wireless
technology merely fuels wireless applications that demand more spectrum
for efficient operation. This fact, coupled with the threat of "spectrum
drought," has prompted the FCC to propose a more flexible approach to
wireless spectrum licensing, so that secondary markets for spectrum can
efficiently distribute spectrum where it is needed most. It is unclear at
this time, however, whether this strategy will alleviate the increasing
problem of spectrum scarcity in the United States.
deadline is "unrealistic"). In addition, in recent hearings before the Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee, Senator John McCain has stated that by 2006, "this
country will have neither the transmission facilities, nor the digital content, nor the reception
equipment needed to ensure that 85% of the population will be able to receive digital
television as their exclusive source of television." Hearing on the Transition to Digital
Television Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 107th Cong.
(2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/-commerce/hearings/0301jsm.pdf (statement of
Sen. John McCain) (last visited Apr. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Digitial Television Hearing]. At
the same hearing, James L. Gattuso, Vice President for Policy and Management at the
Competitive Enterprise Institute, concurred, stating that "[b]ased on current adoption rates,
digital television is extremely unlikely to achieve the 85 percent goal by 2006" and
predicting further that it is more likely that DTV adoption would rank at 30 percent at best.
Digital Television Hearing, supra, available at http:llwww.senate.gov/-commercel
hearings/0301gat.pdf (statement of James L. Gattuso) (last visited Apr. 2, 2001). Moreover,
Dr. Joseph S. Kraemer, Director of LECG, an economics consulting firm, presented
evidence at this hearing that the 85 percent benchmark could only be achieved by 2006-
2008 under the best of circumstances, including the adoption of must-carry and all-channel
receiver rules. Otherwise, a moderately paced transition would likely yield the 85 percent
benchmark between 2010-2012, and a slower paced transition would yield the 85 percent
benchmark sometime after 2014. Digital Television Hearing, supra, available at
http://www.senate.gov/-commerce/hearings/0301gat.pdf (statement of Joseph S. Kraemer)
(last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
142. William E. Kennard, Spectrum: The Space Odyssey, Remarks Before the Indus.
Telecomms. Ass'n (Oct. 5, 2000), at http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/kennard/
speeches.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2001).
143. Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Dev.
of Secondary Markets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, para. 6, 2000 WL 1736657 (F.C.C.)
(Nov. 27, 2000) (noting that "in recent years rising demand has created a shortage of
spectrum available for the deployment of both mobile and fixed wireless technologies and
services in the United States"). See also Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of
Spectrum by Encouraging the Dev. of Secondary Markets, Policy Statement, paras. 3-10,
2000 WL 1760080 (F.C.C.) (Dec. 1, 2000).
[Vol. 53
SHVIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Therefore, if critics can describe Red Lion and its progeny as
moribund, they must rest their arguments not on the pragmatic justification
of increased spectrum availability, but on other, more theoretical or
philosophical grounds. A full defense of Red Lion is beyond the scope of
this Article, but it is worth noting at least two broad theoretical concerns.
First, critics charge that the simple scarcity of a good does not require
governmental allocation of those goods.' 44Those who advance this position
argue, for instance, that all economic goods are scarce-including
"newsprint, ink, delivery trucks, computers and other resources"-and
145therefore not everyone who wishes to publish a newspaper may do so.
These critics also charge, however, that a relaxed constitutional
jurisprudence does not-and should not-apply to newspapers by virtue of
this scarcity. Similarly, a relaxed constitutional analysis should not apply to
the broadcast medium.146 By arguing via analogy to the newspaper medium,
however, these critics have ignored the Supreme Court's explicit
understanding that "the special physical characteristics of broadcast
transmission, not the economic characteristics of the broadcast market, are
what underlies [its] broadcast jurisprudence."' 47
Second, recognizing the unique problem of interference within the
broadcast spectrum, critics also charge that the importance of avoiding
interference between broadcasters does not necessarily require the
management of broadcasting content. 148 Thus, under this view, the
governmental management role is reduced to that of a "traffic cop" that
ensures that broadcasters not interfere with each other's signals. Despite the
attractive simplicity of this argument, it runs contrary to decades of
congressional, judicial, and administrative interpretation regarding the
FCC's authority to license the use of the airwaves in the "public interest.'
'149
144. See Time-Warner Entn't Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723,724 (1997) (per curiam)
(Williams, J., dissenting) (denying en banc rehearing).
145. Id. (quoting Telecomms. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501,508-09
(D.C. Cir. 1986)).
146. Id.
147. TurnerI1 512 U.S. 622,640 (1994).
148. Time-Warner Entm't Co., 105 F.3d at 725 (per curiam) (Williams, J., dissenting)
(denying en banc rehearing).
149. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,215 (1943).
The Act itself establishes that the Commission's powers are not limited to the
engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio communication. Yet we
are asked to regard the Commission as a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave
lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other. But the Act does not
restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the
Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic. The
facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them.
Methods must be devised for choosing from among the many who apply. And
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Deference to congressional intent requires that any reinvention of the
government's role in this area should come from the people's
representatives through appropriate legislation, rather than through judicial
reversal.
Until these broader, more philosophical arguments have been
accepted by the courts or by Congress, the scarcity rationale should not be
immediately dismissed as dead law. The scarcity rationale is still, for better
or for worse, the underlying basis of our broadcast jurisprudence. Indeed,
the government management of an increasingly crowded radio spectrum
may become even more relevant than before as the "new economy"
continues to mature.
IV. APPLYING THE "RELAXED" BROADCAST STANDARDS
There is little doubt that, like broadcasters and cablecasters, DBS
operators engage in speech-related activities.150 As a preliminary matter,
however, the D.C. Circuit has held that no First Amendment right exists "to
make commercial use of the copyrighted works of others," except where
such activity falls within the category of "fair use.' 5' Thus, where
Congress deliberately conditions the use of a statutory copyright license on
compliance with FCC policies, generally no First Amendment right is
implicated. 52 Nevertheless, assuming that the DBS operators' rights of free
expression are somehow implicated, the First Amendment rights of
broadcasters have been traditionally limited. This section argues that the
DBS service is a broadcast medium for constitutional purposes, and that §
338 is content-neutral. In light of these two facts, § 338 easily passes
muster under rational basis scrutiny, and, in the alternative, it also survives
intermediate scrutiny.
A. The DBS Service Is a Broadcast Medium for Constitutional
Purposes
DBS carriers use the limited resources of the radio spectrum to uplink
and downlink their video programming to subscribing members of the
public via satellite.'53 On one hand, because it uses the radio spectrum to
since Congress could not do this, it committed the task to the Commission.
Id. at 215-16.
150. TurnerI, 512 U.S. at 636 (declaring that "[tihere can be no disagreement ... [c]able
programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled to the
protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment").
151. United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that
cable syndicated exclusivity rules do not violate the First Amendment).
152. Id.
153. Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999: Broad.
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deliver its services to large regions of the country with the intent of
attracting subscribers, the DBS service may seem to resemble a broadcast
service. The FCC has determined that for regulatory purposes, however,
wireless subscription services like DBS are not broadcast technology
because they are directed solely to subscribers and are not accessible to the
public at large.1 54 Nevertheless, in 1996, the D.C. Circuit in its Time-
Warner decision affirmed that, despite its regulatory status, the DBS
service is a broadcast technology for constitutional purposes, reasoning that
DBS uses the scarce resource of the broadcast radio spectrum and noting
that orbital slots for DBS service are limited. 55 As the court stated:
The Supreme Court recognized, in 1969, that because of the limited
availability of the radio spectrum for broadcast purposes, "only a tiny
fraction of those with resources and intelligence can hope to
communicate by radio at the same time".... The same is true for
DBS today. Because the United States has only a finite number of
satellite positions available for DBS use, the opportunity to provide
such services will necessarily be limited. Even before the first DBS
communications satellite was launched in 1994, the FCC found that
"the demand for channel/orbit allocations far exceeds the available
supply.' 56
One critic has charged that, in holding that DBS is a broadcast
technology for constitutional purposes, the Time-Warner court "ignored the
FCC's own preliminary classification of DBS as a nonbroadcast service.'
5 7
This criticism misses a critical distinction, however, between the FCC's
regulatory treatment of DBS and the court's treatment of DBS for
constitutional purposes.
The regulatory treatment of DBS has been the subject of debate since
the inception of the technology. 58 The term "broadcasting" is defined in the
Communications Act as "the dissemination of radio communications
intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of
relay stations."'59 When the FCC began to regulate DBS in 1982, it
Signal Carriage Issues, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,147, para. 8 (2000).
154. See Subscription Video, Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 1001, paras. 32-34, 62 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 389 (1987); Nat'l Ass'n for Better Broad. v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
155. Time-Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
156. Id. (citations omitted).
157. See Richard L. Weber, Note, Riding on a Diamond in the Sky: The DBS Set-Aside
Provisions of the 1992 Cable Act, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1795, 1817 (1999).
158. For an illuminating discussion of the broadcast/nonbroadcast distinction as it
applies to DBS and other subscription services, see Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line
Between Conventional "Broadcast" and Wireless "Carriage," 97 COLuM. L. REv. 1048
(1997).
159. 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(6) (West Supp. 2000). Similarly, the National
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envisioned that DBS would be a broadcast service, but left open the
possibility that licensees could elect to provide services either as
"broadcasters, common carriers, private radio operators, or some
combination or variant of these classifications."'' 60 As of 1998, the FCC
reported that all DBS licensees had chosen regulation as nonbroadcast,
noncommon carriers.' 6' In 1984, the D.C. Circuit affirmed these regulations
in National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC, but vacated the FCC's
decision to treat as nonbroadcasters those DBS program providers that
leased channels from satellite companies to provide programming directly
to homes ("customer-programmers"). 162 The court's analysis of the FCC's
past policies and its independent analysis of the Communications Act led it
to conclude that such services were broadcasts:
When DBS systems transmit signals directly to homes with the intent
that those signals be received by the public, such transmissions rather
clearly fit the definition of broadcasting; radio communications are
being disseminated with the intent that they be received by the public.
That remains true even if a common carrier satellite leases its channels
to a customer-programmer who does not own any transmission
facilities; in such an arrangement, someone-either the lessee or the
satellite owner- is broadcasting.
The court concluded that the FCC could not, without reasoned
explanation, depart from the FCC's previous conclusion that
"[tihe primary touchstone of a broadcast service is the intent of the
broadcaster to provide radio or television program service without
Telecommunications and Information Agency ("NTIA") also defines broadcast as "the
distribution of electronic signals to the public at large using television (VHF or UHF) or
radio (AM or FM) technologies." NTIA, Dep't of Comm. Pub. Telecomms. Facilities
Program, 15 C.F.R. § 2301.2 (2000).
160. Inquiry into the Dev. of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broad. Satellites for
the Period Following the 1983 Reg'l Admin. Radio Conference, Report and Order, 90
F.C.C.2d 676, para. 84, 51 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1341 (1982), recon. denied, 94 F.C.C.2d
741, 53 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1637 (1983). These regulations stated that those DBS
applicants that provided either free or subscription service directly to homes and that
retained control over the content of their transmissions would be treated as broadcasters.
Alternatively, a DBS satellite owner was considered a nonbroadcaster if it chose instead to
operate as a common carrier, in which case it would have to offer satellite transmission
services indiscriminately to the public pursuant to a tariff under the provision of Title II of
the Communications Act. Also not treated as a broadcaster under the regulations were those
who leased satellite transponders from DBS common carriers and who used the leased
channels to distribute programming via satellite to individual homes, so-called "customer-
programmers." Nat'l Ass'n of Broads. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(discussing FCC DBS regulations).
161. Implementation of Section 25 of the Cable Television Consumer Prot. and
Competition Act of 1992; Direct Broad. Satellite Pub. Interest Obligations, Report and
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discrimination to as many members of the general public as can be
interested in the particular program as distinguished from a point-to-
point message service to specified individuals . .. broadcasting
remains broadcasting even though a segment of the public is unable to
view programs without special equipment."'6
Therefore, the court held that "DBS, at least when directed to individual
homes, is radio-communication intended to be received by the general
public-despite the fact that it can be received by only those with
appropriate reception equipment,"' and vacated a portion of the FCC's
Order.
In 1987, the FCC determined that all wireless subscription video
services, including DBS, were to be classified as wireless "point-to-multi-
166point" services, rather than as broadcasting. The D.C. Circuit affirmed
this change in policy in 1988. The court noted in National Association for
Better Broadcasting v. FCC that the Commission had typically looked to
the licensee's intent to determine whether a particular transmission
constituted a "broadcast." 6 8 For many years, the FCC looked to the content
of the transmissions to ascertain the intent of the licensee, reasoning that
broadcasts did not occur when the transmissions were designed to be of
169interest only to a limited segment of the public. The new policy,
however, changed the focus to the mode of operations of a wireless service,
holding that all subscription services are nonbroadcast services if they
demonstrate an intent to limit "receipt and enjoyment" to paying
subscribers.1 70 The FCC determined that a sufficient index of this intent
included requiring the use of special antennae and/or signal converters so
that the signal can be viewed at the home, encrypted signals designed to
limit access, and private contractual arrangements.171 In affirming the
change in policy, the court reasoned that, because the statutory definition of
broadcasting was ambiguous, the agency interpretation of this term merited
Chevron deference. 72 The D.C. Circuit concluded that a change in agency
interpretation alone was not arbitrary or capricious if the agency offered a
164. Id. (quoting Further Notice in the Matter of Subscription Television Serv., 3
F.C.C.2d 1, 9-10 (1966).
165. Id. at 1204 (emphasis added).
166. Subscription Video, Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 1001, paras. 32-34, 62 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 389 (1987) [hereinafter Subscription Video Report and Order].
167. Nat'l Ass'n for Better Broad. v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
168. Id. at 666.
169. Id. at 666-67.
170. Subscription Video Report and Order, supra note 166, para. 32.
171. Id. para. 41.
172. Nat'l Ass'n for Better Broad., 849 F.2d at 668 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat'l
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
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reasoned explanation, and in this case, the FCC did just that.'7 1
The FCC, with the blessing of the courts, has thereafter generally
treated DBS subscription services as nonbroadcast technology. This
regulatory status, however, has been weakened somewhat by subsequent
legislation. In the 1992 Act, Congress directed the FCC to adopt rules to
impose on DBS providers public interest or other requirements that were
strikingly similar to those required of broadcasters.' 74 For example, DBS
carriers now must provide reasonable access to their facilities to candidates
for federal elective office on request, 75 as well as equal opportunities for'-... 76
legally qualified candidates for any public office to use their facilities.
Therefore, the 1992 Act, together with the Time-Warner decision and the
FCC's differential treatment, arguably may lend credence to the contention
that the nonbroadcast quality of DBS service is not as obvious as it might
appear at first glance.
Most importantly, however, the complex regulatory treatment of DBS
may be irrelevant to its constitutional status. The Time-Warner court may
simply have treated DBS as a broadcast service for constitutional purposes,
given the use of the broadcast spectrum and the unique limitations of that
medium, and may not have intended to define it as a broadcast service for
regulatory purposes. Viewed from this perspective, the Time-Warner
court's decision to classify DBS as a broadcast service for constitutional
purposes does not represent an unwarranted departure from the FCC's
regulatory classification, because the two classifications serve separate and
distinct purposes. For instance, the regulatory classification relies, as a
matter of statutory construction, on the definition of "broadcasting" in the
Communications Act and the intent of a licensee to restrict its radio
communications by some technological method. 77 By contrast, the
constitutional classification demands understanding of the First
Amendment and its core value of wide dissemination of ideas from diverse
173. Id. at 669.
174. Cable Television Consumer Prot. and Competition Act of 1992, 102 Pub. L. No.
385, 102 Stat. 1501, § 25(a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 335 (1994)).
175. 47 U.S.C. § 335(a); FCC Safety and Special Radio Servs., 47 C.F.R. § 100.5 (b)(1)
(2000).
176. 47 U.S.C. § 335(a); 47 C.F.R. § 100.5(b)(2). The FCC still defines DBS as a
wireless technology that distributes its services directly to the general public, a quality
shared with broadcasters. 47 C.F.R. § 100.3 (defining "Direct Broadcast Satellite Service"
as "[a] radiocommunication service in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space
stations are intended for direct reception by the general public. In the Direct Broadcast
Satellite Service the term direct reception shall encompass both individual reception and
community reception.").
177. See supra notes 166, 172.
[Vol. 53
SHVIA AND THE FIRSTAMENDMENT
178
sources. Therefore, it is entirely rational, and perhaps especially
appropriate, for the term "broadcasting" to mean one thing under the
Communications Act and something else under the Constitution. In the
case of DBS, it is now established that the service is a broadcast technology
for constitutional purposes.
B. Section 338 Is Content-Neutral
The Supreme Court has held that "[a]s a general rule, laws that by
their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis
of the ideas or views expressed are content-based."' 179 Conversely, the Court
has also held that "laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech
without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances
content-neutral."' I ° The SBCA claims that § 338 is content-based in two
respects. First, the SBCA alleges that the carriage of particular
programming triggers § 338.181 Second, the SBCA claims that the statute is
designed to promote the programming of independent broadcasters over
182
network or other proprietary programming.
A strong argument can be made, however, that the local carriage
obligations attached to the use of the royalty-free statutory license comprise
a content-neutral form of broadcast regulation, because the statute does not
obligate a DBS service provider to carry any particular programming or to
espouse any particular "ideas or views.' '813 Nor is a DBS carrier penalized
for the expression of any particular views. Rather, the carriage obligations
apply evenhandedly to all DBS carriers who choose to carry local stations
pursuant to the royalty-free statutory copyright license, and the regulations
178. See supra note 155.
179. Turner 1, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994); id. (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,
197 (1992) ("Whether individuals may exercise their free speech rights near polling places
depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign"); Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988) (whether municipal ordinance permits individuals to "picket in
front of a foreign embassy depends entirely upon whether their picket signs are critical of
the foreign government or not")).
180. Id. at 643; id. (citing City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984) (stating that an "ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property 'is
neutral-indeed is silent-concerning any speaker's point of view')); id. (citing Heffron v.
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981) (noting that a "State
Fair regulation requiring that sales and solicitations take place at designated locations
'applies evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit
funds')).
181. Mem. in Supp. of P1's Mot. for Summ. J. as to the First Amendment Issues, at 8, 12-
13, SBCA v. FCC, (E.D. Va. 2000) (No. 00-1571-A) [hereinafter Mem. in Supp. of Pl's
Mot. for Summ. J. as to the First Amendment Issues].
182. Id. at 23-28.
183. See supra note 179.
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are designed to address content-neutral concerns.
Unlike those cases where particular points of view triggered speech-
restrictive laws, 8 4 the obligation of satellite carriers to carry all local
broadcast stations within a market is triggered by the use of a substantial
government subsidy-i.e., the use of the royalty-free statutory copyright
license-not by the content of the programming carried."' To illustrate this
point, a satellite carrier that does not avail itself of the statutory copyright
license could potentially carry the same stations and programming as a
satellite carrier that uses the statutory license. The difference is that the
former would have to negotiate with each station for carriage on the DBS
system, while the latter's use of the statutory license would make such
negotiation unnecessary. Congress made this aspect of § 338 abundantly
clear in the Conference Report accompanying SHVIA when it stated that
satellite carriers had a choice whether to incur local carriage obligations,
and that satellite carriers were free to carry any programming they wanted
without using the statutory license if they could clear the property rights."'The use of the statutory copyright license is therefore independent of the
184. Compare Burson, 504 U.S. at 197 ("Whether individuals may exercise their free
speech rights near polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a
political campaign."), and Boos, 485 U.S. at 318-19 (stating that whether municipal
ordinance permits individuals to "picket in front of a foreign embassy depends entirely upon
whether their picket signs are critical of the foreign government or not"), with FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) ("[I]n order to determine whether a
particular statement by station management constitutes an 'editorial' proscribed by § 399,
enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the message that is
conveyed to determine whether the views expressed concern 'controversial issues of public
importance."').
185. The local carriage obligations are triggered only when a satellite carrier
"provid[es], under section 122 of title 17, United States Code, secondary transmissions to
subscribers located within the local market of a television broadcast station of a primary
transmission made by that station ..... 47 U.S.C.A. § 338(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000)
(emphasis added).
186. "Satellite carriers remain free to carry any programming for which they are able to
acquire the property rights. The provisions of this Act allow carriers an easier and more
inexpensive way to obtain the right to use the property of copyright holders when they
retransmit signals from all of a market's broadcast stations to subscribers in that market. The
choice whether to retransmit those signals is made by carriers, not by the Congress." Joint
Explanatory Statement, supra note 22, at HI 1,795. The FCC concurs with this theory: "This
provision gives satellite carriers a choice. If satellite carriers provide their subscribers with
the signals of local television stations through reliance on the statutory copyright license,
they will have the obligation to carry all of the television signals in that particular market
that request carriage. If satellite carriers provide local television signals pursuant to private
copyright arrangements, the Section 338 carriage obligations do not apply." Implementation
of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999: Broad. Signal Carriage Issues,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,147, para. 10 (2000). See also DBS Order,
supra note 25, para. 15 ("If a satellite carrier provides local television signals pursuant to
private copyright arrangements, the Section 338 carriage obligations do not apply,").
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programming carried and is not triggered by the carriage of any particular
programming or the expression of any point of view. As opposed to cable
"must-carry," SHVIA allows a satellite carrier to choose whether to incur
the must-carry obligation in a particular market in exchange for the benefits
of the local statutory license.'8
Moreover, SHVIA does not deprive any programmers of potential
access to carriage by satellite carriers. As discussed above, satellite
carriers remain free to carry any programming for which they are able to
acquire the property rights. The provisions of SHVIA allow carriers an
easier and more inexpensive way to obtain the right to use the property of
copyright holders when they retransmit signals from all of a market's
broadcast stations to subscribers in that market. The choice whether to
retransmit those signals is made by carriers, not by Congress. 88 In sum,
unlike laws triggered by the expression of particular views, § 338 is
triggered by the use of the statutory copyright license, and is therefore
content-neutral.
In addition, Congress made it clear that the local carriage provisions
served the interest of localism in broadcasting, not because it preferred the
programming of local broadcast stations to national programming outlets,
but because a healthy and decentralized system of local broadcasters better
served the public interest in diversity in the marketplace of ideas. Congress
explicitly stated that SHVIA was designed with the following two
principles in mind: First, SHVIA's legislative history stated that
"promotion of competition in the marketplace for the delivery of
multichannel video programming is an effective policy to reduce costs to
consumers; '' 189 and, second, the legislative history emphasized the
importance of "protecting and fostering the system of television networks
as they relate to the concept of localism."'"9 In stating the particular
purposes underlying § 338, Congress noted that the local carriage provision
was "intended to preserve free television for those not served by satellite or
cable systems and to promote the widespread dissemination of information
from a multiplicity of sources"-interests that the Supreme Court has
found to be substantial and unrelated to the suppression of free
187. Compare 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 534-535, with id. § 338. See also Joint Explanatory
Statement, supra note 22, at HI 1,795.
188. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 22, at H1l,795.
189. Id. at HI 1,792.
190. Id. It also recognized that in creating a statutory copyright license, it was acting "in
derogation of the exclusive property rights granted by the Copyright Act to copyright
holders, and that it therefore needs to act as narrowly as possible to minimize the effects of
the government's intrusion on the broader market in which the affected property rights and
industries operate." Id.
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expression.191
In enacting SHVIA and § 338, Congress intended not simply to favor
one class of programmers over another, but to preserve the structural
integrity of the nation's broadcasting system by supporting the principles of
localism, universal service, and diversity. 92 As the Conference Report
pointed out, given Congress's prediction that DBS carriers would only
voluntarily carry those stations liable to produce substantial revenues, these
principles would not have been served if DBS carriers were not encouraged
via the statutory copyright license to carry all local stations where local
service is provided.193
Moreover, as the Conference Report discussed, § 338 was intended to
create a viewpoint-neutral conditional grant of a royalty-free statutory
license-analogous to an indirect subsidy-in exchange for local carriage
obligations. Citing Rust v. Sullivan, the Conference Report stated that "the
proposed licenses are a matter of legislative grace, in the nature of
subsidies to satellite carriers, and reviewable under the rational basis
standard."'
194
In Rust, the Supreme Court upheld regulations limiting the ability of
federal funding recipients to engage in abortion-related activities using
such funds. The Court stated:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so
doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of
191. Id. atH11,795 (citing TurnerI, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994)).
192. In addition to being expressed in the Conference Report, this concern for localism,
universal service, and diversity was confirmed in floor statements made by members of
Congress:
In proceeding legislatively, we have tried to remain true to two important
communications values, namely localism and universal service. We have tried to
balance these values even as we factor in the innovative changes that have
occurred in satellite technology, as well as the dire need for greater competition to
incumbent cable companies in the video marketplace.
145 Cong. Rec. at H1I1,816 (Nov. 9, 1999) (statement of Rep. Markey).
193. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 22, at Hi1,795.
Providing the proposed license on a market-by-market basis furthers both goals by
preventing satellite carriers from choosing to carry only certain stations and
effectively preventing many other local broadcasters from reaching potential
viewers in their service areas. The Conference Committee is concerned that,
absent must-carry obligations, satellite carriers would carry the major network
affiliates and few other signals. Non-carried stations would face the same loss of
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the other.195
Although the Court did note that the government cannot impose
"unconstitutional conditions" on the "receipt of a benefit,"'96 the Court
distinguished funding restrictions that placed conditions on the recipient
from those that placed conditions on the program or service funded.
97
Whereas the former may be invalid, the latter do not violate any
constitutional protection, because a recipient could engage in the
disfavored activity without the use of federal funds.' 98
Similarly, DBS carriers are free to carry the local broadcast signals of
any station for which they can acquire the rights and need not depend on
the royalty-free statutory copyright license to provide these stations to their
subscribers. Like the subsidy in Rust, the statutory copyright license
imposes conditions on use of the license, not on the user. Therefore, where
the government provides a subsidy to encourage certain kinds of behavior,
but places constitutionally acceptable conditions on the subsidy, the
Supreme Court has held that the government is not engaging in content-
based discrimination. With regard to § 338, the conditional royalty-free
statutory copyright license is directly analogous to a conditional subsidy,
except that where ordinary subsidies involve the distribution of money
from the public treasury or the granting of a tax credit, the subsidy in § 338
gives satellite carriers a limited reprieve from the strictures of copyright
law through the mechanism of a royalty-free statutory copyright license.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez199 does not contradict this interpretation. In Velazquez, the Court
held unconstitutional a law prohibiting Legal Services Corporation
("LSC") lawyers from receiving LSC funds if their representation of
indigent clients involved an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing200
welfare law. Justice Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, interpreted Rust
as a case in which the government "used private speakers to transmit
information pertaining to its own program,"20' but reasoned that Rust was
195. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (upholding regulations limiting the
ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities with those funds).
196. Id. at 196 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)).
197. Id at 197.
198. Id. The "'unconstitutional conditions' cases involve situations in which the
Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a
particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the
protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program." Ida t 197.
199. 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1954 (Feb. 28, 2001).
200. Id. at *9.
201. Id. at *15-16 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995)). "[V]iewpoint-based funding decisions [can be sustained] in instances in
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inapposite to the facts in Velazquez, because the LSC lawyers were not
government speakers, directly or indirectly. 2 2 The Court then interpreted its
precedent as establishing that, where viewpoint-based funding restrictions
affect the diversity of views from private speakers in a medium of
expression and "distort its usual functioning," the courts must engage in a
203
more searching examination. The Court then concluded that the medium
of expression distorted by the LSC restriction was the legal system itself-
an effect that implicated the core values of the First Amendment,
separation-of-powers principles, and fundamental concepts of statutory
204
reviewability.
Broadly construed, the Velazquez decision may stand for the
proposition that a subsidy indirectly facilitating private speech, and
conditioned on a viewpoint-based funding restriction that "distorts" the
usual functioning of the expressive medium, violates the First
Amendment's free-speech guarantee. As discussed previously, however,
§ 338 is not viewpoint-based. Moreover, the rebroadcast of local signals
into local markets was not an established medium of expression prior to the
passage of § 338, as DBS providers did not have the legal right to
implement "local-into-local" service until the law passed.
which the government is itself the speaker ... or instances, like Rust, in which the
government uses private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own program."
Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229,
235 (2000); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
202. "The advice from the attorney to the client and the advocacy by the attorney to the
courts cannot be classified as governmental speech even under a generous understanding of
the concept. In this vital respect this suit is distinguishable from Rust." Id. at *18.
203. Id. ("Where the government uses or attempts to regulate a particular medium, we
have been informed by its accepted usage in determining whether a particular restriction on
speech is necessary for the program's purposes and limitations.").
204. "Restricting LSC attorneys in advising their clients and in presenting arguments
and analyses to the courts distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role of the
attorneys in much the same way broadcast systems or student publication networks were
changed in the limited forum cases we have cited." Id. at *21. In addition, the restriction
"prohibit[ed] speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise
of the judicial power," id. at *23, and "threaten[ed] severe impairment of the judicial
function," id., a result that was "so inconsistent with accepted separation-of-powers
principles" as to be "an insufficient basis to sustain or uphold the restriction on speech." Id.
at *24. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the funding restrictions effectively insulated
current welfare laws from constitutional scrutiny and other legal challenges, insofar as an
indigent client was unlikely to find other counsel to pursue such claims. Id. at *25-26. The
Court stated, for instance, that unlike the petitioners in Rust who were able to obtain
abortion counseling outside the federally funded program from unaffiliated doctors, there
"often will be no alternative source for the client to receive vital information respecting
constitutional and statutory rights bearing upon claimed benefits." Id. at *25. Accordingly,
the Court stated, 'We must be vigilant when Congress imposes rules and conditions which
in effect insulate its own laws from legitimate judicial challenge." Id at *28-29.
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Nevertheless, an even narrower construction of the Velazquez
decision may be more plausible, as its principles may apply only in cases
where the government indirectly restricts speech near the core of First
Amendment protection, namely criticism of laws, regulations, or policies.
Velazquez's scope may narrow even further, however, in light of the
Court's reliance on the fact that the LSC restrictions implicated separation-
of-powers principles as well as fundamental concepts of statutory
reviewability. By contrast, however, § 338 does not obviously implicate the
special values articulated by the Court in Velazquez. It does not restrict the
ability of DBS providers to criticize governmental actions. Nor does it in
any way implicate fundamental concepts of judicial review or separation-
of-powers principles. Lastly, in the DBS context, unlike the situation in
Velazquez, in which the plaintiffs could not pursue their constitutional or
statutory challenges outside of the subsidized program, DBS operators may
freely step outside of the copyright subsidy program to carry local
broadcast signals into local markets. For these reasons, Velazquez is more
than likely irrelevant to the analysis of the constitutionality of § 338.
C. Section 338 Survives the Rational Basis Test
Once § 338's content-neutrality is established, it is relatively easy to
see how it passes the rational basis test. First, Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce carries with it the ability to preserve the network-
affiliate system by imposing restrictions on a nationwide broadcast
205
medium. Moreover, the Supreme Court has already concluded that the
interests in preserving the benefits of free over-the-air television,
promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity
of sources, and promoting fair competition in the market for television
programming do not relate to the suppression of free expression and serve
important or substantial governmental interests.2°' In addition, the Supreme
Court has held that the first two interests lie at the core of the values
protected by the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.20' Lastly, the
205. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943) (declaring that "[t]he
licensing system established by Congress in the Communications Act of 1934 was a proper
exercise of its power over commerce").
206. Turner 1, 512 U.S. 622, 662-63 (1994).
207. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (declaring that "[i]t is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee"); see also Time-Warner Entm't
Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (declaring that "[a]n essential goal of the
First Amendment is to achieve 'the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources.' ... Broadcasting regulations that affect speech have been
upheld when they further this First Amendment goal.") (quoting FCC v. Nat'l Citizens
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means used must be rationally related to the legitimate ends, and empirical
evidence or sound reasoning will suffice where specific findings are not
• 208
possible. As explained above, it was Congress's considered judgment
that, by 2002, the market power of DBS carriers would tempt them to carry
only some broadcast stations and not all broadcasters, to the detriment of
201diversity in broadcasting. Section 338 attempted to forestall this
possibility by providing a limited incentive to carry all broadcast stations
while at the same time respecting market forces.
It is true that, at the time of enactment, no figures were available
regarding the share of the market DBS carriers would possess by 2002 or
the effect of this market share on local broadcasting, because DBS local-
into-local service had not yet been inaugurated. Congress reasonably
predicted that given the envisioned effect of the legislation, however, the
DBS carrier market share of the multichannel video distribution market
would significantly increase by 2002. Congress also predicted that, once
this market presence was established in certain areas, DBS carriers would
choose to carry only some broadcast stations. This prediction was based on
Congress's experience with the cable industry's refusal to carry some local
210stations in the absence of cable must-carry legislation during the 1980s.
In general, Congress's predictions were prophetic. On September 8,
2000, the SBCA reported to the FCC that DBS viewership nationwide
totalled approximately 14.5% of all television households (as compared
with cable's 70% viewership), and that DBS providers gained more than
three million subscribers between June 1999 and June 2000. In addition,
DBS providers had achieved a market penetration rate of more than 30% in
211three states and nearly 40% in one state, Montana. Moreover, recent
figures indicate that DirecTV now serves nine million subscribers and
offers local television signals to "about 60[%] of the U.S. households in 38
markets," making it the third largest provider of multichannel video
programming in the country after AT&T Broadband and Time Warner
212Cable. These same figures indicate that EchoStar serves five million
Comm. for Broad. 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
208. Time-Warner Entm't Co., 93 F.3d at 976.
209. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 22, at H11,795.
210. Id. at Hi1,795 ("Non-carried stations would face the same loss of viewership
Congress previously found with respect to cable noncarriage.") (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-
628, at 51 (1992); S. REP. No. 102-92, at 62 (1991)).
211. See Comments of the SBCA, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in
the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, CS Docket No. 00-132 (Sept. 8, 2000),
at 6.
212. Ted Hearn, One Year Later, DBS Law Has Big Impact, MULTICHANNEL NEws (Nov.
27, 2000) at 1.
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subscribers and offers local television signals in thirty-four markets "that
include about 60[%] of the U.S. population., 21 3 Despite satellite carriers'
protestations to the contrary, this increasing market share has encouraged
both EchoStar and DirecTV to carry only the local affiliates of the four
major commercial networks in selected local markets while steadfastly
refusing to carry other nonaffiliated local channels. 214 In point of fact, both
EchoStar and DirecTV have refused to carry any local public televisionS215
stations, with the exception of WGBH in Boston.
The SBCA has objected that the method chosen to preserve local
broadcasting actually discourages the carriage of local stations in the top
markets and thus thwarts the end desired by Congress, namely full carriage
of all local broadcasters over DBS.1 6 The SBCA argues that for every local
station a DBS service provider must carry in a top market, that provider
retains less capacity for the carriage of local stations in lower markets, and,
217therefore, the means chosen to effectuate the ends are irrational.
The SBCA's argument, however, overlooks a variety of factors. First,
it ignores the traditionally low standard associated with judicial evaluations
of congressional rationality.2 8 Second, the argument disregards the fact that
business concerns often drive satellite carriers' decisions not to provide
service to smaller or rural markets, reflecting the carriers' resource
allocation priorities rather than congressional irrationality. Lastly, Congress
213. Id.
214. For local programming on EchoStar's Dish Network, see Dish Network,
Programming-Local Networks, at http://www.dishnetwork.com/content/programming/
locals/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2001). For local programming on DirecTV, see
DirecTV, Local Channels Are Now Available, at http://www.directv.com/howtogetl
howtogetpages/0,1076,224,00.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2001). DirecTV and EchoStar do
claim that they carry the local signals of WB and UPN stations as well as some independent
stations in selected markets. See Decl. of Stephanie Campbell, 18, and Dec1. of Michael S.
Schwimmer, 19, in Exs. to Pl's Mot. for Summ. J. as to First Amendment Issues, supra
note 181.
215. Both EchoStar and DirecTV carry the PBS national feed on their national services,
but this feed does not replicate a great deal of programming provided by local public
television stations to serve the needs and interests of their local communities. Moreover, the
authorization to use the PBS national feed expires on January 1, 2002. 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(1)
(Supp. V 1999).
216. Mem. in Supp. of P's Mot. for Summ. J. as to the First Amendment Issues, supra
note 181, at 21-23.
217. Id.
218. Turner I, 520 U.S. 180, 199 (1997).
The Constitution gives to Congress the role of weighing conflicting evidence in
the legislative process. Even when the resulting regulation touches on First
Amendment concerns, we must give considerable deference, in examining the
evidence, to Congress' findings and conclusions, including its findings and
conclusions with respect to conflicting economic predictions.
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attempted to enact the Rural Local Broadcast Signal Act ("Rural Signal
Act") on the same day and as part of the same legislation to address this
concern with rural and smaller markets.219 Recognizing that "major satellite
carriers intended to provide local broadcast TV stations via satellite only in
the largest markets rather than in more rural areas," a previous version of
the Rural Signal Act established a program, jointly managed by a variety of
administrative agencies, to "guarantee loans not exceeding $1.25 billion for
,,220providing local broadcast TV signals in rural areas. Sponsors dropped
this provision in response to a filibuster threat from Senator Gramm and
replaced it with the current provision that called for the FCC to report to
Congress on its findings regarding rural access to local television signals
over satellite and to study the use of "wireless cable" service to such221
areas. A new version of the original loan guarantee program was
subsequently added as part of the Commerce-Justice appropriations
package, however, and became law at the end of last year.222 Thus, it cannot
be said that Congress was acting irrationally when it focused on local
service in the larger markets through § 338 without addressing the delivery
of local signals over DBS to rural areas. Congress merely bifurcated its
concerns about delivery of local signals in larger markets and smaller
markets, addressing the latter in a later session and in a separate law.
Therefore, when viewed in its proper context, § 338 easily passes
rational basis scrutiny. The statute is a content-neutral regulation of
219. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 22, at HI 1,796, explaining Title II of the
"Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999."
220. Id. at HI 1,797.
221. See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, Title II. See also Arthur Brodsky, Rural Loan Program
Eliminated from SHVA, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 19, 1999; Arthur Brodsky, SHVA Bill Trimmed
of Rural Provisions, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 12, 1999. On December 8, 2000, the FCC
determined that terrestrial wireless cable technology could share the spectrum at 12.2-12.7
GHz with DBS and proposed service rules for the new Multichannel Video Distribution and
Data Service ("MVDDS"). Quoting section 2002(a) of the Rural Local Broadcast Signal
Act, the FCC opined that these rules would promote Congress's mandate "'to make a
determination [] regarding licenses or other authorizations for facilities that will utilize, for
delivering local broadcast television station signals to satellite television subscribers in
unserved and underserved local television markets, spectrum otherwise allocated to
commercial use."' Amendment of Pts. 2 and 25 of the Comm'n's Rules to Permit Operation
of NGSO FSS Sys. Co-Frequency with GSO and Terrestrial Sys. in the Ku-Band Frequency
Range, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, para. 289-90
(Dec. 8, 2000), 2000 WL 1804138 (F.C.C.).
222. "A bill making appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia and
other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of said District for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes." Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114
Stat. 2762 (enacting the "Launching Our Communities' Access to Local Television Act of
2000," H.R. 5548, Title X).
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broadcasting designed to serve the legitimate interests of preserving
localism in broadcasting through the network-affiliate relationship and
promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity
of sources.
D. Section 338 Survives Intermediate Scrutiny
As discussed above, should a court find that the conditional copyright
exemption contained in § 338 constitutes a content-based regulation of
broadcasting, or that § 338 is content-neutral but that DBS systems should
be viewed as a nonbroadcast technology, the court would be required to
223
apply intermediate scrutiny. Thus, under League of Women Voters, a
court would have to examine whether § 338 is narrowly tailored to further a
substantial governmental interest,224 and, under Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting, it would be obligated to ask whether the restriction on lawful
and nonmisleading speech directly advances a substantial governmental
interest in a way that is "not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest. ''22 Similarly, under the intermediate scrutiny associated with
content-neutral regulation of nonbroadcast technology, announced in the
Turner cases, § 338 would survive if it supported an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free
speech and did not burden substantially more speech than was necessary to
further those interests.26
The three interests underlying SHVIA and § 338 are important and
substantial. As explained above, Congress intended to foster three interests:
"(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television,
(2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a
multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market
for television programming. ' 227 The Supreme Court has held that all three
interests are substantial or important and are unrelated to the suppression of
228free expression. In addition, the Court has also held that the first two
interests lie at the core of the values protected by the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech.229
223. See supra Part iIM.B.
224. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
225. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999)
(quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980)).
226. TurnerI, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 663.
229. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Time-Warner Entm't Co.
v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Moreover, these interests are directly advanced by the means chosen,
which are narrowly tailored to accomplish the identified interests. In this
regard, the test does not require an objective evaluation of whether the
means chosen were appropriate. Although Congress must demonstrate that
"'the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate
them to a material degree, ' ' 230 "the Government is not required to employ
the least restrictive means conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow
tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest. '231 Thus, the
direct advancement and narrow tailoring elements are satisfied in the
intermediate scrutiny context if Congress considered whether the means
chosen are proportional to the ends identified.232
Indeed, Congress had already anticipated this inquiry in the legislative
history to § 338. The Conference Report argued that its carefully
constructed copyright exemption would withstand intermediate scrutiny
because "no narrower alternatives" would have achieved its goals."' For
instance, Congress examined and rejected the possibility that DBS
subscribers would install over-the-air antennae with A/B switches, or
subscribe to cable service in addition to their DBS service, to receive local
214stations not otherwise carried on DBS. Congress also examined and
230. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc., 527 U.S. at 188 (quoting Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
231. Id. When considering whether the cable must-carry statute was narrowly tailored,
the Supreme Court in Turner II, stated that "our cases establish that content-neutral
regulations are not 'invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might
be less burdensome on speech."' Turner 1I, 520 U.S. 180, 217 (1997) (quoting United States
v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). See also id at 217 ("Our precedents establish that
when evaluating a content-neutral regulation which incidentally burdens speech, we will not
invalidate the preferred remedial scheme because some alternative solution is marginally
less intrusive on a speaker's First Amendment interests.").
232. For instance, the Supreme Court has concluded that within the context of
intermediate scrutiny, narrow tailoring "need not be the least speech-restrictive means of
advancing the Government's interests" but is satisfied if the "'regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation."' Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 799 (1989) (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689)). In other words, in the context of
intermediate scrutiny, narrow tailoring requires only that the "means chosen do not 'burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests."' Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). See also Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc., 527 U.S. at 188 (1999) (terming "narrow tailoring" in the
intermediate scrutiny context as "a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that
represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to
the interest served") (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
233. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 22, at Hi1,795.
234. Id. Regarding A/B switches, the Supreme Court in Turner I detailed the reasons for
Congress's rejection of A/B switches as a less restrictive alternative within the cable must-
carry context. The Court reiterated testimony that "many households lacked adequate
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rejected the use of national feeds as an alternative to local carriage
obligations, concluding that national feeds would thwart its identified
interests by "siphon[ing] potential viewers from local over-the-air
affiliates. 235 Because there were no acceptable alternatives that would
preserve local, over-the-air broadcasting better than the means chosen,
Congress concluded that "trading the benefits of the copyright license for
the must carry requirement [was] a fair and reasonable way of helping
viewers have access to all local programming while benefiting satellite
carriers and their customers.
' 236
The DBS industry has argued that DBS poses no threat to local
broadcasting, because, unlike cable companies, DBS carriers are not aS 237
"bottleneck" monopoly of vertically integrated video services. Thus, they
argue that cable television carriers may pose a threat to local over-the-air
broadcasting, because they compete with the stations carried for advertising
revenue. By contrast, the DBS industry has claimed that DBS carriers have
strong incentives to carry local stations because they are not vertically
238integrated.
Nevertheless, an examination of local carriage rosters indicates that
DBS carriers are carrying only those local stations affiliated with the four
largest networks. 23 For instance, neither EchoStar's Dish Network nor
DirecTV offer the local signals of public television stations, with the
exception of WGBH in Boston. Therefore, despite the DBS industry's
protestations to the contrary, Congress was substantially correct in its
evaluation: In this transitional period before local must-carry is triggered,
DBS carriers have displayed little tendency to carry the signals of all
broadcast stations in those markets where local service is provided.
Moreover, although DBS carriers are not currently vertically integrated
with program providers, this may soon change. For instance, General
antennas to receive broadcast signals; A/B switches suffered from technical flaws; viewers
might be required to reset channel settings repeatedly in order to view both UHF and cable
channels; and installation and use of the switch with other common video equipment (such
as videocassette recorders) could be 'cumbersome or impossible."' Turner II, 520 U.S. at
219-20.
235. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 22, at HI 1,795.
236. Id.
237. Mem. in Supp. of P's Mot. for Summ. J. as to the First Amendment Issues, supra
note 181, at 33-34.
238. Id.
239. See DirecTV, Local Channels Are Now Available, at http://www.directv.com/
howtogetlhowtogetpages/0,1076,224,00.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2001); Dish Network,
Progranning-Local Networks, at http://www.dishnetwork.com/content/programming/
locals/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2001). See Decl. of Stephanie Campbell, 18 and
Decl. of Michael S. Schwimmer, 19, in Exs. to Pl's Mot. for Summ. J. as to First
Amendment Issues, supra note 181.
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Motors, owner of Hughes and its subsidiary DirecTV, has reportedly been
seeking a buyer for DirecTV, which possesses 65% of the DBS market.2
°
News reports have indicated that DirecTV likely will soon be sold to an
alliance between Rupert Murdoch's Newscorp and John Malone's Liberty
Media Group, two entities with substantial programming interests, although
Viacom, Comcast, Sony, and Disney have also been reported as potential
buyers.24'
The DBS industry's most familiar complaint, however, is that § 338
imposes excessive burdens because the statute demands an unreasonable
amount of limited channel-carrying capacity from DBS carriers. 242 This
complaint primarily arises in the regulatory context, where it is claimed
that DBS carriers are technically barred from carriage of all local television
stations in the country because of alleged limitations on channel-carrying
capacity.243 Despite how the DBS industry frames it, however, the issue is
not whether full carriage of all the television stations in the nation is
possible, 244 but whether DBS carriers have the capacity to carry every local
station in those markets where local service is provided.
Nevertheless, an evaluation of the channel-carrying capacity of the
DBS infrastructure is made exceedingly difficult by the industry's
reluctance to release this information to the public. A recent report on the
DBS industry's channel-carrying capacity derived from publicly available
sources and filed with the FCC by the Association of America's Public
Television Stations, however, indicates that the limitations on capacity
have been vastly overstated.245 The report states that "virtually complete
carriage of local television signals ... is well within the potential
productive capacity of DBS systems that can be realistically deployed and
efficiently exploited using available technical knowledge and spectrum
assignments. 246 Currently, EchoStar and DirecTV have a combined
240. Bruce Branch, GM Having Trouble Getting Right Price for Hughes Electronics,
COMM. DAILY (Nov. 27, 2000).
241. Skyreport, GM Board to Meet, Hughes on the Agenda? (Dec. 4, 2000), at
http://www.skyreport.com/skyreport/dec2000/l204O0.htm#three; Bruce Branch, Hughes
Moves Closer to Selling DirecTV, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 20, 2000; Bruce Branch, Murdoch
Reportedly Close to Finalizing DirecTV Deal, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 8, 2001.
242. See Comments of the SBCA, CS Docket No. 00-96 (July 14, 2000), at 3-6; Reply
Comments of EchoStar, CS Docket No. 00-96 (Aug. 4, 2000), at 9; Reply Comments of
DirecTV, CS Docket No. 00-96 (Aug. 4, 2000), at 29-31.
243. See supra note 242.
244. There are 1,663 full-power television stations in the nation. FCC, News Release,
Broadcast Totals as of September 30, 2000, (Dec. 1, 2000) 2000 FCC LEXIS 6301.
245. Strategic Policy Research, Channel-Carrying Capacity of DBS Systems, CS Docket
No. 00-96 (Nov. 17, 2000), at 4.
246. Id.
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capacity of approximately 960 channels.247 The report indicates that by
using "spot-beam" technology, which directionalizes down-link signals and
allows for reuse of spectrum more efficiently, DBS carriers could triple
248their current channel-carrying capacity. Moreover, by using spectrum in
the Ka band, DBS carriers can use higher-frequency satellites with smaller
antennae and more spot beams per satellite, allowing for a single Ka-band
satellite to carry all of the local analog broadcast stations in the nation with
capacity to spare.249 Both spot-beam technology and the Ka band are either
being used now by DBS carriers or will be used in the near future.
Therefore, no technical impediment exists to prevent the hypothetical full
carriage of all of this nation's full-power television stations by DBS
carriers, although realistically, DBS carriers will likely only serve a
fraction of all local markets.
It is evident, therefore, that Congress considered other apparently less
restrictive alternatives, but dismissed them after careful consideration. It is
further evident that, despite the satellite industry's protestations to the
contrary, the industry is not interested in the full carriage of all local
television stations and may presently, or in the future, possess a direct
economic incentive to refuse carriage of unaffiliated broadcast stations.
Lastly, the satellite industry's claims of limited capacity, although difficult
to assess, are vastly overstated and pose no technical impediment to full
carriage of all local broadcast stations in markets where local-into-local
service is provided. Accordingly, § 338 would survive intermediate
scrutiny, because it is narrowly tailored to advance substantial
governmental interests.
V. CONCLUSION
By adding § 338 to the Communications Act, the Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 established local satellite carriage
obligations in exchange for the significant benefit of a royalty-free
statutory copyright license. In drafting this legislation, Congress intended
both to encourage the development of the DBS industry as a competitor of
cable and to preserve the system of local, free, over-the-air broadcasting.
Although § 338 may indirectly affect the free speech interests of satellite
carriers, it is a carefully constructed, content-neutral regulation of a
broadcast technology. According to the relaxed broadcast standard of
scrutiny associated with Red Lion and its progeny, this restriction of free
speech is therefore constitutional, because it is rationally related to the
247. Id. at 2.
248. Id. at 2-3.
249. Id. at 3.
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legitimate governmental interests noted above. Alternatively, § 338 may
survive under intermediate scrutiny as well, because it is narrowly tailored
to serve substantial governmental interests.
